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ABSTRACT  
 
 
There is no a consensus in the IR literature on the possible implications of AI for cyber or nuclear 
capabilities, and whether AI would exacerbate, or potentially mitigate, the security dilemma between 
actors with varying capabilities. This paper explores these questions, using experts’ interviews and 
secondary data. It has tackled the issue under study by using the most-similar method in which most of 
the variables are similar.  
 
The paper argues the weaponization of AI exacerbates the security dilemma between states since it 
increases uncertainty. What is actually problematic about the military AI applications, as opposed to 
other military capabilities, is the declining role of humans. AI could be productive and 
counterproductive when it comes to policy making, implying the necessity of keeping humans over-
the-loop. Neutralization makes AI deterrence reasonable for avoiding destructive, disruptive and 
manipulative outcomes. Like nuclear capabilities, establishing an AI-MAD structure, regulating the 
uses of AI and establishing a governing regime for AI arms race are the best possible policies.  
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 5 
Introduction:  
The weaponization of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has the potential to change the 
nature and the character of warfare. As seen in cyber warfare, AI is expected to be the 
future battlefield of warfare since it can be used as an enabler of a weapon or it could 
be weaponized as it was the case with nuclear capabilities. To put it simple, it would 
allow states to employ both kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities, separately or 
altogether.  
 
The chief objective of this paper is to investigate the worrisome phenomenon of 
weaponized Artificial Intelligence and how it exacerbates the security dilemma 
between states in both symmetric and asymmetric settings. This in turn accelerates AI 
arms race, which eventually invokes crisis instability and arms race instability. In 
respect, this paper is to explore the potential implications of AI on national polices, 
interstate relations, and the foundations of the international regime governing 
relations between states. This piece is to suggest the formation of an international 
regime for governing AI.    
 
The weaponization of AI might put the world order and the foundations of 
international peace and security at a shaky ground.  Thus, state actors, non-state 
actors, such as the IAEA and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, international 
lawyers and private companies should consider either of the two policy options: 
regulating AI and ensuring that its uses are in conformity with the parameters of the 
current global regime, or establishing a novel global system, in which AI replaces 
states, for maintaining international peace and security. From a utopian angle, the 
establishment of a new global system looks awesome at first glance. But, the first 
policy option is the most doable one given that it just requires the establishment of a 
regime similar to the one which was established for regulating nuclear arms race.     
    
 Problem Statement:  
There is an excessive use of Artificial Intelligence-enabled applications in the military 
realm coupled with the unprecedented advancement in killer robots and the massive 
production of drones. This mirrors the hasty inclination to possess the most advanced 
AI military applications, so as to intensify AI race. The IR literature has narrowed 
down the focus to the possible implications of AI on nuclear capabilities without 
investigating how AI will alter the nature of a weapon technology. The IR literature 
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has failed to see the other side of coin and did not investigate how AI could be 
employed for confidence-building and for enhancing security. It is illogical to assume 
the uselessness of AI; a developed version of cyber technology, in cyber defense.  
 
Besides to investigating the potentials of AI from a technical point of view, there is a 
need to explore the implications of AI on interstate relations and how the AI race 
could be addressed. Also, ushering for international legal instruments and the call for 
coherent policies at the national and international levels are essential for regulating 
the uses of AI. The international community should accept the fact that AI race is 
irreversible, but regulating it is the best possible choice.   
 
The IR literature has largely overlooked the possible implications of coupling other 
weapons, including nuclear and cyber, with AI capabilities and has lamentably 
disregarded to investigate how that might increase their destructive potentials, and 
uncertainty.  This paper explores whether the weaponization of AI could create a 
MAD-like structure since it exacerbates the security dilemma between states? The 
paramount objective of this paper is to investigate the efficacy of AI, which 
aggravates the security dilemma between states, as a deterrent tool.  In the context of 
offense-defense theory, it investigates how AI, either as an enabler of a weapon or a 
weapon, would dictate future wars, and it also examines would it makes offense or 
defense dominant. Along with exploring the implications of AI on other weapon 
systems, this paper raises a question: would signaling an AI second-strike capability 
or establishing an AI equivalent of Mutually Assured Destruction reduce the 
probability of a cyber, conventional or even a nuclear war? To answer this, this 
piece introduces two hypotheses: (i) Nuclear MAD could create an AI-MAD even if 
the first-strike capability is advantageous in the cyber realm; (ii) AI capabilities 
could strengthen cyber defense, thereby AI-MAD could be feasible.  
 
 Argument:   
Since the civilian AI applications have been weaponized with their potentials 
to revolutionize and change the nature and the character of future wars, there 
is no doubt that AI with its dual-use nature does exacerbate the security 
dilemma between states in both symmetric and asymmetric settings. AI 
strengthens cyber deterrence by preemption and by demonstrating the ability 
to retaliate in the cyber realm. AI, like nuclear capabilities, has its advantages 
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and disadvantages since it can enhance cyber defense and nuclear safety, on 
the one hand, and can be employed wrongfully and in a manipulative way, on 
the other.  This further indicates that AI has the second-strike capability amid 
the growing uncertainty over its potentials, and the intentions of rivalry states. 
AI deterrence can exist in tandem with nuclear deterrence due to its 
destructive, disruptive and manipulative potentials. Based on that, an AI MAD 
like structure is the optimal policy option for mitigating the security dilemma 
between states and maintaining international peace and security. This 
requires finding out ways for diluting the pace of AI arms race, which has 
been deviated from the commercial sphere to the military one. Accordingly, 
the international community should make all efforts to regulate the uses of AI 
and control AI proliferation since we cannot reverse it. This indicates that 
regulating the uses of AI through the establishment of legal instruments will 
not be sufficient, notably with the involvement of private companies. 
Regulating AI requires both a political will and a consensus, otherwise the 
outcomes would be disastrous. A comprehensive framework, incorporating 
the legal, political, ethical, economic and security aspects, is highly 
recommended for maintaining international peace and security. More 
important, the international community should not allow, under any 
circumstances, militaries to be governed by machines since the psychological 
factor is crucial in military‟s decision-making.     
 
Client Description: 
Dr Waleed Rashad:  
Brief Bio: 
Dr. Walled Rashad is an assistant professor of sociology at the National Center for 
Social and Criminological Research. In parallel with his career of over 15 years, he 
has contributed to academic research in the area of cyber security.  He publishes his 
studies and findings at many periodical journals, including the Democracy Journal 
(Al-Democrateya) and The Contemporary Thinking Journal (Al-Fakr Al-Mo’aser). 
Some of his contributions were published by Egypt Police Research Center. His 
academic contributions have included: two studies on “Cyber/Internet Cafés: under 
the titles of “Internet Cafes as a Public Sphere” and “Virtual Actors’ Interactions”; 
two book chapters under the titles of “Social Mobilization in the Cyber Domain” and 
“Social Strata and the Transformations of the Virtual Community:  National and 
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International Debate”; a study on the interactions that take place in the cyber domain. 
He also co-authored a study under the title of “The Internet as An Alternative Media 
Platform”. He also wrote a book review entitled as “Cyber Culture” and a journal 
article entitled as “The Internet of Things (IoTs): A Sociological Approach”. 
Moreover, he participated in many symposiums and conferences. He also has earned a 
Ph.D. of Arts from Ain Shams University and three master’s degrees of sociology. 
One of his master thesis tackled the multiple actors in the cyber sphere.  
 
His recognizable experience in the field of research will certainly provide a thorough 
insight into the analogy between AI and cyber capabilities, in addition to nuclear 
ones. Based on his academic experience in the field, he will provide a thorough 
analysis and a convincible evaluation of the research findings. He could also validate 
or nullify the findings of this research when it comes to practicality. Also, he could 
assess the applicability of the policy recommendations suggested in this research or 
even add more recommendations. Adding to this, he might direct the academic 
community to the negative implications of AI weaponization coupled with the 
weaponization of the Internet of Things (IoTs) or even usher for, at the sidelines of 
symposiums and conferences, any of the policy recommendations mentioned in this 
paper.      
 
Background:  
The use of Artificial Intelligence in militaries is not a new phenomenon, but the 
inclination to upgrade AI military applications and semi-autonomous drones to 
those that can operate autonomously and without humans‟ intervention is the 
eye-catching phenomenon that raises concerns among scholars and experts. 
For the time being, AI is bolted into arrays of weapon systems, such as aircrafts, 
submarines, and is also installed in command and control systems (C2), and critical 
logistical infrastructure, (Meserole, 2018). Today’s AI is somehow limited in its 
capacities but with the possible progress in the dreamy one-shot learning and quantum 
computing, the security dilemma will become irreducible.  
 
Over the past years, militaries have proliferated and have produced armed drones that 
can serve at both the tactical and operational levels, in an effort to reduce human 
causalities and gain a military advantage. Donald Rumasfeld; the former Secretary of 
Defense, had introduced the concept of “the mechanization of war” by which the US 
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army is made up of half robots and half humans, (Soliaman, 2019). The US 
Department of Defense has made AI, besides to human soldiers and manned 
personnel, as an integral element of its Third Offset Strategy. In an effort to slash 
costs, it was reported that Japan’s AI-enabled rockets is underway, (Nausca, 2011). 
Due to the effectiveness of semi-autonomous weapons systems, both “killer robots” 
and unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) have become very appealing to many actors.         
 
AI was supposed to be used for surveillance, reconnaissance and military tactical 
operations, but its uses have broadened when states employed AI applications in their 
information and cyber warfare. In 2010, Israel and US launched Stuxnet against Iran’s 
nuclear facilities in lieu of a conventional military attack, marking a paradigm shift in 
warfare. Since then, the cyber domain, coupled with the growing reliance on UAVs 
and drones, has become the new battleground. The most recent example is the 
Russian information warfare by which it took measures to overtly or covertly 
influence, (Polyakova, 2018) the American public opinion during the latest US 
presidential elections. There are many other examples of an AI-enabled cyber 
warfare, of which the deviation of a civilian flight from its destination, (Rashad, 
2019). All of these examples signify the protraction in the uses of AI applications and 
cyber capabilities. Such an observation is critically important since a number of 
experts expressed their concerns over the possibility of misusing AI capabilities for 
subverting those of an adversary, (Giest et al, 2018). 
  
As a result, the term of “Algorithmic Warfare” has dominated the IR literature 
since it will change the battlefield we know with the primacy of intelligence warfare 
and will dictate future wars. 30 scientists, technologists and military experts pointed 
out that there will be three new elements that will define and will shape the future 
battlefield by 2050. These are cyber capabilities and technologies; a complex, highly 
disputed information sphere, as well as a human force with advanced physical and 
cognitive skills, (Kott et al, 2015). These elements have stimulated an AI arms race, 
with China attempting to surpass the US and to become a key player in the AI plane, 
(China May Match, 2017). More than 30 countries possess or are developing drones 
for military uses, such as intercepting high-speed rockets, (Scharre, 2017). 
 
Ongoing speculations about the weaponization of AI have generated contradictory 
opinions over the potentials of AI on nuclear, cyber and even conventional weapons. 
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Each camp holds differing views over the promising and negative potentials of AI 
over nuclear and cyber capabilities. For nuclear capabilities, Theorists argued that 
exploiting new technologies makes nuclear stalemate reversible and reduces nuclear 
survivability which is actually based on concealment, hardening and redundancy, 
(Lieber et al, 2017). Meanwhile, it can bolster nuclear counterforce. Concerning cyber 
capabilities, the automation of data analysis and targets prioritization trigger data 
poisoning, (Brundage et al, 2018). However, AI-enabled detecting software will 
embolden cyber defense with their abilities to detect code vulnerabilities.   
 
Scholars have also observed that a mass of AI-enabled applications could threaten 
both combatants and non-combatants, and it would make “algorithmic warfare”, 
(Layton, 2018) in contravention to international law. The inherent hazards of 
unregulated “algorithmic warfare”, coupled with the absence of humans, could entail 
unintended engagement, causing fratricide and civilian causalities or triggering 
inadvertent escalation, (Layton, 2018). From a security perspective, fully autonomous 
weapons and unmanned vehicles seem impractical for matters of life and death, unless 
humans are over-of-the loop, since they cannot operate in or effectively adapt to 
highly changeable and complex environments, (Layton, 2018). Also, in the context of 
cyber warfare, unregulated algorithms, coupled with the weaponization of the Internet 
of Things (IoTs), could induce cost on adversaries by attacking critical infrastructure 
and networks, (Liff, 2012) thereby triggering causalities among non-combatants and 
civilians. The literature has suggested various policy options for regulating and 
mitigating the uses of AI, and for avoiding future intelligence and algorithmic 
warfare. Some of these policy options are useful, such as the synergy between human 
cognition and machines intelligent computation. Arguably, the human-machine 
teaming would complement the missing piece of the puzzle through advanced, speedy 
data analysis and human cognition.  Adding to this suggestion, there are calls for 
drafting a Digital Geneva Convention, (Why We Urgently Need, 2017) and 
preventive arms control. Further, the weaponization of AI has raised concerns among 
states’ leaders, CEOs of private companies, and over 60 NGOs, (Scharre, 2017) 
which called for the banning of AI, (Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter, 2015).  
 
In parallel, several steps and endeavors were taken, including the announcement of an 
International Panel on Artificial Intelligence by Canada and France at the sideline of 
a G7 conference. The aims have been providing support, embracing the responsible 
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adoption of a human-oriented AI and facilitating international cooperation, (Shead, 
2018). Also, the Berkman Klein Center launched the “Ethics and Governance of 
Artificial Intelligence Initiative” for bolstering the proper use of AI, (Ethics and 
Governance of AI). All of these mesmerizing endeavors imply how pressuring the AI 
weaponization and denote the urgency of taking a global collective action.  
     
Therefore, experts and policy-makers should be far-sighted while assessing AI as a 
weapon/an enabler by investigating how it would spark arms race, and should 
hypothesize its implications when it is either nascent or advanced and when humans 
are over- and out-of-the loop. They should also consider the malignant and the 
harmless uses of AI while investigating its implications on the security dilemma, 
which usually exacerbates because of the AI’s effectiveness, scalability, rapid 
diffusion, speedy potentials, and its dual-use nature, (Brundage, 2018). They should 
also consider how to ameliorate and reduce uncertainty which arises because of the 
manipulative and disruptive potentials of AI and because of the emergence of new 
threats and vulnerabilities, such as impersonation, (Brundage, 2018) redirection of 
flights, amid the absence of punitive and attributive measures.  
 
 Literature Review: 
 
Technological advances are a double-edged sword for a state’s national security. On 
the one hand, new technology can enhance a state’s defensive capacity, and can 
enhance a state’s ability to deter potential hostile acts by adversaries. On the other 
hand, technological advances can also exacerbate the security dilemma. Likewise, 
technological advances spur potentially destabilizing arms races between rival powers 
when they are neither certain over the sort of capabilities developed nor their 
implications on the balance of power. When a rival state increases its defensive 
capability, the security dilemma exacerbates in this respect. With weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs), states may launch pre-emptive or even preventive strikes, when 
they suspect an adversary of developing new and potentially dangerous capabilities as 
it was the case when Israel attacked Iraq in 1981. Paradoxically, such strikes or 
rhetoric threatening such acts are often seen as justifications for acquiring more 
advanced and destructive weapons. 
 
 12 
Technological advances lead to the escalation of the security dilemma and the 
emergence of new military revolutions. Based on the history of military development, 
ten military revolutions took place as a result of technological advances, 
(Krepinevich, 1994). The weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons are 
perfect examples of technological advances that exacerbated the security dilemma 
between rival states during the Cold War era. Based on Krepinevich’s argument, 
further military revolutions will occur inasmuch as technological advances are steady, 
thereby exacerbating the security dilemma since an adversary maintains a competitive 
advantage, (Krepinevich, 1994). Like other technologies, Artificial Intelligence (AI), 
the latest innovative technology which is currently used in daily life routines, might 
heighten the security dilemma and might underwrite a new military revolution amid 
the increasing tendency to use it in the military sphere. Based on Krepinevich’s 
argument, the application of Artificial Intelligence to military sphere would result in a 
military revolution that requires organizational innovation, the production of a new 
system, organizational adaptation and technological change within military 
organizations, (Krepinevich, 1994).  
 
Though Artificial Intelligence (AI) is not a newly invented technology, it has lately 
gained momentum due to recent cataclysms over its potential implications over both 
national and international security amid the increasing tendency to weaponize it and 
to use it in military applications. AI has dozens of definitions which mirror the 
developments and advances in such a kind of technology throughout the past decades. 
The definition of AI has broadened from being merely termed as the automation and 
the computation of intelligent behavior to be defined as the ability of computerized 
systems to implement tasks which are used to be performed by humans only and to 
replicate mental skills, including the perception of natural languages, pattern 
recognition and adaptive learning, which have been monopolized by humans, (De 
Spiegeleire et al, 2017). As a result of steady progress in AI, the AI literature has laid 
out four approaches of artificial intelligence: (1) computerized systems that think 
humanly, (2) computerized models which are designed to think rationally, (3) 
machines that act like human beings, and (4) the creations of automated systems that 
act and behave rationally, (De Spiegeleire et al, 2017).  These four approaches can be 
categorized under two dimensions: (1) thought process and (2) rationality, (Russell, 
2009).  This classification highlights various orientations and paradigms of AI.  
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Such a progress in AI sheds the light on the plausible implications of AI upon the role 
of human in the military sphere in the aftermath of using machine learning and deep 
reinforcement learning. This implies that AI could pose a threat to a state’s security 
since there are aspirations for making human-out of the loop, thus machines will 
surpass human intelligence after they have been used either for carrying out certain 
tasks in alignment with human intelligence or performing a full range of tasks with a 
human supervision, (De Spiegeleire et al, 2017). AI meanwhile enhances the 
capabilities of a state. Therefore, uncertainty over the military, legal, and 
humanitarian impacts of AI weapons looms over the horizon.  
 
Artificial Intelligence resembles nuclear weapons in terms of being initially invented 
for peaceful and civilian purposes, and for being eventually used for military 
purposes. Artificial intelligence has a great potential for being used in diverse sectors 
ranging from medicine, education, business, finance, cybersecurity to marketing, (De 
Spiegeleire et al, 2017).  However, both AI researchers and IR specialists are 
concerned with the potential weaponization of AI, and they highlight the need to 
avoid errors and regulate AI for peaceful purposes. There have been military 
applications of Artificial Intelligence such as drones, including robots and anti-missile 
systems, (Bates, 2017).  The commonality between nuclear weapons and artificial 
intelligence also includes the probability of spurring AI arms race to mitigate the 
security dilemma and restore strategic stability, (Geist et al, 2018). Equivalent to the 
nuclear weapons, it is hard to define the nature of AI as weapon and how it would 
affect states’ behavior, as per Mohan who highlighted the problematic nature of good 
and bad weapons/technologies. He stressed that the differentiation between good and 
bad weapons/technologies is challenging given that certain weapons/technologies 
could be a stabilizing factor at some point due to targeting accuracy and their efficacy 
in a second-strike capability.  However, they could eventually be regarded as 
destabilizing weapons, if other sorts of anti-weapons technologies such as Anti-
Ballistic Missiles are developed, (Mohen, 1986). 
 
With this analogy between AI and nuclear weapons and their destructive potentials, 
and with the rapid advances in AI, it is worth considering how they might exacerbate 
the security dilemma since there is a consensus in the IR literature over the 
undeniable inclination to militarize the AI technology. However, the AI literature in 
itself is polarized over the use of AI in the military realm. Proponents claimed that AI 
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militarization has its own advantages. Such advantages range from decreasing the 
number of human combatants which would definitely reduce causalities to the 
accessibility to dangerous areas through the employment of unmanned vehicles and 
robots, (Etzioni et al, 2017).  They additionally argued that AI would be of great help 
in the decision-making process since robots are equipped to carry out and coordinate 
multitasks, (Etzioni et al, 2017). Consequently, around of 30 states, (Autonomous 
Weapons, 2016) are pursuing AI capabilities including the United States which 
develops killer robots for integrating them in its third offset strategy.    
 
Proponents also supported automation in weapons since they mistakenly assume that 
autonomous weapons could put an end to the legal dilemma over civilian causalities, 
(Autonomous Weapons, 2016) thereby precluding a state’s responsibility. On the 
contrary, as opponents always emphasize on both ethical and legal dilemmas of using 
autonomous weapons and the negative repercussions of the declining humans control 
over the course of war, autonomous weapons would increase civilian causalities. With 
the development of AI-enabled weapons, humans might not be the essential operators, 
(Autonomous Weapons, 2016). Hence, this nullifies the view point of proponents, 
arguing that autonomous weapons could have better abilities in targeting and 
discriminating military objects from civilian ones, as well as performing tasks with 
greater precision and reliability. Proponents’ assumption is dubious given that humans 
have better judging abilities and can act as either moral agents or human as fail-safe 
when autonomous weapons fail to judge the situation correctly, to adapt to changing 
circumstances or to perform tasks effectively, (Autonomous Weapons, 2016).   More 
importantly, the utilization of AI in armed conflicts sets off alarm bells over the 
applicability of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), (Kreps et al, 2012). Defenders 
of autonomous weapons see that AI would fulfil the requirements of Article 48 of the 
1977 additional Protocol, (Kreps, 2012). However, such an assumption is 
unreasonable because AI could instigate collateral damage due to fallacious 
distinction. Thus, the ongoing controversy over AI highlights the dichotomy between 
autonomy in weapons and human control. 
  
This transformation in the usage of AI technology accentuates that the security 
dilemma will be intensifying. Today’s conflicts accelerate vicious races in technology 
for the purpose of enhancing a state’s defensive power to avoid annihilation, as John 
Hers argued. Though this argument is short-sighted given its disregarded the fact that 
 15 
the security dilemma is mutual. Robert Jervis speculates that the security dilemma 
arises when a state accumulates more capabilities, such as AI, in an effort to 
strengthen its security, thereby endangering the security of the other state, (Tang, 
2009).   
 
Tang argued that a genuine security dilemma exists when anarchy prevails, and 
defensive measures are taken without malicious intentions. (Tang, 2009). This 
classification helps rivals differentiate between accidental escalation under the 
security dilemma and a measured response to possible aggression.  Thus, Jervis and 
Tang’s definitions incorporate of both objective sense which assesses the lack of 
threats to a state’s acquired values, and subjective sense which represents the freedom 
from fear over the loss of a state’s values, (Buzan, 1991). In other words, their 
definitions are based on Arnold Wolfers’ definition of security that entails both the 
material aspect and the psychological factor. They likewise coincide with Kenneth 
Waltz’s definition of security that sees world as anarchic due to the lack of upper-
hand authority, resulting in the emergence of self-help system where competition 
exists, (Williams et al, 2008).  
 
Thus, in the current anarchic system, (Waltz 1959), AI could tighten the security 
dilemma due to the uncertainty over its destructive capabilities and adversaries’ 
intentions even if they are merely security-seekers. Thus, Tang’s contribution to the 
literature would help states in measuring the severity of the security dilemma when it 
applies to the AI realm. To assess the severity of the security dilemma in the AI 
realm, there is a need to decide whether offense or defense is dominant. Given that the 
AI literature is still undeveloped, there is no a clear-cut assumption about the nature 
of AI as a weapon. The AI literature has mistreated the offense-defense balance and it 
has not thoroughly tackled the relation between AI and other types of weapons.  
 
The AI literature has unduly covered the mismatch between AI and conventional 
weapons in spite of striking advancement in killer robots and unmanned weapons that 
are expected to replace manned soldiers in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, what 
stands out is the profound investigation of the relation between AI, on one hand and 
nuclear, cyber and conventional weapons, on the other hand. This further illustrates 
that these weapons should not be investigated separately when their implications upon 
AI deterrence are investigated. The rationale behind this is to hypothesize probable 
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scenarios of the security dilemma based on types of weapons developed and 
possessed in tandem with AI capabilities.  
 
As the security dilemma exists when a state develops weapons or technologies that 
enhance its ability to attack and when a defender finds itself in status where the 
strategic balance has shifted, the theory of the offense-defense balance should be 
considered to determine the severity of the security dilemma. Jervis argued that 
defense is dominant when a defender has no willingness to launch preemptive strikes 
or to carry out preventive attacks to avoid depletion of resources and enormous costs 
of war, (Jervis, 2009). In other words, a state’s perception about the severity of the 
security dilemma is partially based on its relative ease and the shift in the balance of 
power, (Lieber et al, 2017).  Furthermore, Jervis claimed that restoring the balance of 
power is feasible by catching up capabilities, so as to increase the chances of 
cooperation, (Jervis, 2009). While, offense becomes dominant when both sides have 
equal defense budgets; the benefits of preemptive attacks are much higher than 
inaction; the first-strike is advantageous, and when the loser lacks concrete evidences 
about the winner/adversary’s intentions, (Jervis, 2009).  By applying this to AI, it is 
worthy to consider the effect of such a novel technology on the mobility of weapons 
(killer robots, cyber weapons) and their destructive power, (Lieber et al, 2017) to 
decide whether AI weapons favor offense or defense.  Beside to evaluating the 
strategic, operational and the tactical aspects of an AI strike, empirical logic says that 
both the psychological aspect, and the reconcilability and irreconcilability of interests 
should be studied, (Tang, 2009). Given that AI specialists and researchers have 
disregarded the possibility of using civilian AI capabilities in the military sphere, in 
spite of plentiful incidents in the history of warfare and the noticeable reliance on 
drones and unmanned vehicles, it is highly significant to take conflict of interests, the 
offense-defense variables, and technological advances into consideration when 
measuring the severity of the security dilemma. 
 
Based on the severity of the security dilemma that could be exacerbated by the 
development of AI capabilities, states’ behavior, as Jevris noted, will be influenced 
either by reciprocal fears of retaliation, reciprocal malign intention as rivals develop 
capabilities to intentionally deter each other, (Tang, 2009) and the enormous 
implications of exhausting military resources if the security dilemma is genuine, 
(Jervis, 2009).  
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The novelty of such a kind of technology mounted an intense debate over the 
development of AI capabilities since peaceful applications could trigger AI machine-
led wars. Some experts concluded that artificial intelligence could put personal 
privacy at stake through surveillance monitoring; it also could be used as a coercive 
weapon since it can explore points of weakness in a business organization, (The New 
Dogs of War, 2017). Since it could threaten a business organization, a state’s security 
could be threatened as well. More importantly, tracking AI weaponry suppliers would 
be problematic since AI factories are just integrated networks of virtual facilities. 
Further, it would be challenging to identify the types of AI capabilities whether for 
peaceful or military and subversive purposes, (The New Dogs of War, 2017). Though 
the security experts who participated in Threatcasting Workshop accurately identified 
threats of AI, they disregarded other possible threats of weaponized artificial 
intelligence. A different group of scholars, on the other hand, see that AI could 
heighten the security dilemma through the utilization of malicious cyber capabilities 
and disinformation, as well as surveillance for data mining, (Osoba et al, 2017).  This 
raises a question about the difficulty of attribution  
 
There are other factors that could exacerbate the security dilemma in a dyadic 
relationship even when AI capabilities are developed for peaceful, commercial and 
civilian purposes, including the Research and Development (R&D) expenditure, 
progress in education, economic prosperity, as well as surveillance and 
reconnaissance. The AI medical applications, for instance, could be weaponized 
through the exploitation of or the hacking of medical data attached to the internet by 
attackers/states to inflict damage upon defenders. The production of AI intelligent 
machines for the sake of profit could trigger arms race at the regional level, (Layton, 
2018).  
 
Adding to this, cyber capabilities which are linked to AI software could be 
destructively exploited to launch offense strikes and to disrupt a state’s infrastructure, 
(Eckersley et al, 2018). Cyber capabilities coupled with AI ones could worsen the 
security dilemma since it enhances both offensive and defensive powers of a state vis-
a-vis its neighboring country. This reflects uncertainty over adversaries’ intentions 
and vulnerability of a states’ security system since AI software could stalk on 
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opponent’s security system to attack its weakest point and make it inoperative, (Allen 
et al, 2017).  
 
Concerning information security, cyber-enabled software, along with social media 
botnets would aggravate the security dilemma and would menace a state’s economy 
and its regime through the spread of fake news and data poisoning, (Allen et al, 
2017). Peaceful applications of AI could be used as a sabotage to inflict grave 
economic loss, (Allen et al, 2017).   
 
In the conventional domain, the diffusion of killer robots into real militaries poses a 
threat to a state’s security since its territory is prone to attacks by robots, (Eckersley et 
al, 2018). So, peaceful AI applications have their own pros and cons since they make 
individuals’ life easier but endangering their privacy in the light of individualized and 
intelligentized warfare.    
 
Adding to this, the heated debate over the legality of AI-enabled weapons with the 
difficulty of attribution also reflects international lawyers overwhelming perplexity. 
Around of five arguments have emerged in the international law literature. Of which, 
bestowing a legal personality for AI entities which in turn raises a question about 
liability and accountability in case of non-compliance to international legal 
instruments or the commissioning of illegal acts, (Burri, 2017). This further raises the 
alarm bells over the inability of international lawyers to define liability in the AI 
realm and to outline the cases where a state would be legally responsible for using AI 
applications in the military sphere. While, another argument articulates, the banning 
of fully autonomous weapons under a new set of international legal instruments. It 
further suggests that low level/semi-autonomous weapons could be lawful and could 
be regulated under the international law, thereby lessening the security dilemma. 
Thus, a precise legal definition of a meaningful human control, where the symbiosis 
between humans and machines is defined, should be drafted for avoiding future 
conflicts between AI possessing countries and AI not possessing countries, (Burri, 
2017). Since retaining a degree of control over machines and autonomous weapons 
seems challenging in the age of algorisms-based warfare, a new set of international 
legal instruments could regulate the utilization of AI weapons in conformity with the 
Law of Armed Conflict and the International Criminal Law, (Burri, 2017).  The 
problem of attribution, notably when humans are out of the loop, provides an 
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illustration of how states are subject to the will of machines and are also might be 
legally responsible according to public international law, (Burri, 2017). This further 
implies that public international law should lay out the decisions that should not be 
delegated, under any circumstances, to autonomous machines, (Burri, 2017), in 
addition to outlining the situations where humans should be in/over the loop to master 
the course of war. Another group of international lawyers have introduced a 
supposition suggesting the emergence a super-soft law through the creation of 
international ethical and moral standards, (Burri, 2017). As per this argument, such a 
bottom-up law-making process could be binding at the state level. Janet Koven’s 
counterargument, refuting ethical and moral standardization and their inapplicability 
to the international landscape, (Burri, 2017) was factual and logical amid ongoing AI 
arms race. Further, such a bottom-up lawmaking raises a question about the political 
will and the essentiality of incorporating states in the lawmaking process.  
 
Since AI has triggered an arms race in the commercial sphere which in turn has been 
shifted to the military one (Research and Development in automotive, information 
and communication; aerospace and defense constituted were immense throughout 
2014-2016), (Cuminings, 2017), the AI literature anticipated an array of AI future 
scenarios. One of those scenarios is a “Sputnik Event” triggering a sharp AI race 
between states since maintaining an AI superiority could enhance economic, military, 
defensive, scientific and geopolitical powers of a state, (De Spiegeleire et al, 2017). 
This implies that a Sputnik-like incident for AI is not improbable amid the ongoing 
space warfare. Thus, AI race could pose a threat to a state’s security, notably the 
weaker one. But it could be a stabilizing factor in case of parity.  
 
This raises a plethora of questions about the validity of using AI as a deterrent tool 
and the probable implications of developing AI upon the relations between rivals. One 
possibility, as previously discussed in this paper, is the exacerbation of the security 
dilemma, which could potentially lead to pre-emptive strikes. Another possibility is 
the operation of deterrence -– much like MAD with nuclear weapons - when a state is 
being informed of a rival’s capacity to launch its own destructive strike. 
 
Based on the above, AI could exacerbate the security dilemma, thus the strategy of 
deterrence which has gained momentum among IR scholars during the Cold War era, 
reintroduces itself as a possible solution for the underlying dilemma.  However, it 
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could be problematic when it is applied to AI. Firstly, the elements of deterrence 
should be investigated to assess the soundness of AI as a deterrent tool. The elements 
of the classical deterrence theory, coined by Hobbes, include self-interests, material 
gains, unavoidable conflict and rationality to the international realm. As per the 
findings of other scholars, namely Cesare Beccaria, the strategy of deterrence pertains 
the threat of inflicting high costs on perpetrators to dissuade them from committing 
crimes, (Dilulio).  
 
In other words, the rational theory of deterrence revolves around a state’s ability to 
dissuade its adversary from carrying out certain actions through latent force. 
According to classical theory, deterrence operates when an adversary assumes that its 
rival has considerable military capabilities, threats are credible, and costs would be 
undesirable should provocative actions be taken, (Quackenbush, 2011). Therefore, 
credible ultimatums and the threat of use force are fundamental for effective 
deterrence. Secondly, the level of technological advancement and the dominant trend 
of weaponization should be studied to determine the severity of the security dilemma, 
and to question if AI would deter a state from attack, thus the security dilemma will 
no longer operate since none of the rival states would be defensive, (Jervis, 2009).   
 
By tracing rapid advancement in technologies and weapons and how it has altered the 
art of war throughout the past decades, the term “killer robots” was invented in 
response to the excessive use of drones and robots in military. This term underlines 
the salient apprehension over the ability of “killer robots”, as per Sharkey’s argument, 
to act like humans since they lack human capabilities and human intelligence that are 
required for making military decisions, (Sharkey, 2012). This illustrates that killer 
robots have their own limitations when it comes to war. Since AI weapons would not 
be able to differentiate between civilian and military targets and can cause collateral 
damage, autonomous weapon targeting is worrisome, (Etizioni et al, 2017).  
 
The Israeli Harpy is a perfect example of this problem since it cannot distinguish 
whether the radar is located on an anti-aircraft station or on a civilian facility, 
(Sharkey, 2012). This raises a question about the ability of lethal artificial weapons 
and killer robots to cope the pace of strategic decision-making in combat, especially 
in densely populated areas. Moreover, Garcia’s argument about the inevitability of 
disruptive change in the domains of international peace and security is convincing 
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given that the weaponization of AI signifies the erosion of fundamental international 
norms that regulate the use of force, (Garcia, 2018).  
 
If superiority in AI, as Garcia pointed out, would come in favor of the superior, 
(Garcia, 2018), should it wipe out a state’s ability to respond. If the superior state has 
the ability to launch a first-strike, deterrence will not work and offense will dominate. 
As nuclear weapons have changed the calculus of war during the Cold War, AI, as 
Randolph claimed, could tighten cyberspace and outer space warfare in the wake of 
unprecedented reliance on easily disrupted cyber capabilities, (Kent, 2015). In spite of 
this, scholars are looking forward to tailoring a new doctrine for regulating warfare in 
cyberspace, some of them argued that the first-strike is advantageous in cyberwarfare 
because it is cheaper, and attribution will be challenging since it is hard to track 
perpetrators. Thus, the IR literature should devote more focus on the influence of AI 
capabilities coupled with either cyber capabilities, nuclear capabilities or even both 
capabilities on the second-strike capability. The literature has tackled the first-strike 
capability in the cyber sphere, but with the weaponization of AI, there is a pressing 
need to reassess this argument given that “killer robots” could make the second-strike 
capability a preferable option since the extent of destruction is still obscure and the 
immunity of noncombatants, (Crosston, 2011) a fundamental criterion of Jus ad bello, 
is still unsettled.  
 
By the same token, there is a strong debate over the possibility of a nuclear war in the 
light of robust advantages in both cyber and AI capabilities. Subversionist scholars 
purported that AI could trigger nuclear warfare since adversaries could mislead or 
alter AI capabilities, (Geist et al, 2018). Subervisionists’ view point concurs with the 
alarmists who conceive that advanced Artificial Intelligent capabilities would render 
nuclear arsenals vulnerable, thereby diminishing the strategic balance, (Geist et al, 
2018). Accordingly, AI could be destabilizing given that it could make the second-
strike capability ineffective, (Geist et al, 2018). However, the literature has dismissed 
the fact that nuclear weapons have been used for deterrence even with the occurrence 
of disinformation and cyberattacks. This could tell that nuclear weapons could deter 
an AI first-strike capability since city-sparing, cyberspace-sparing and machine-
sparing dictate leaders’ decisions.   
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Since AI could sharpen the security dilemma through uncertain technological 
asymmetries between great powers and small states, a question raises itself about the 
efficacy of small arsenals as a means of deterrent. In the nuclear realm, small arsenals 
have been successful deterrent as the literature demonstrated it is a matter of 
possession such a kind of destructive weapons. As Jervis stated small arsenals and 
moderate military expenditure could neutralize disparity and high military 
expenditure, so as to restore the second-strike capability. This has been the situation 
with the nuclear weapons. Weak and small states, as Jervis argued, usually prefer 
defense and seek cooperation, but because they might resort to preemptive or 
preventive strikes due to their undesirable position, (Jervis, 2009). This, consequently, 
reduces chances of cooperation. If it is true that the first-strike is advantageous in the 
cyber realm, small and weak states could launch cyberattacks as preemptive strikes. 
This could generate two scenarios: (1) a retaliatory attack by using AI capabilities, 
causing collateral damage and making defense dominant or (2) inaction since the 
defender has no other options to retaliate, therefore making offense dominant. If the 
defender does not possess a nuclear arsenal, the weaker state could launch AI-enabled 
cyberattacks. Therefore, it is highly possible to carry out a nuclear or an AI strike. 
However, the situation would be quite different when a state possesses cyber, nuclear 
and AI capabilities given that both nuclear capabilities and AI applications, which 
enhance cyber defense, could make defense dominant. More importantly, geography 
and the location of weapons could be determinant factors in the strategy of deterrence. 
As Jervis allured both conventional weapons and nuclear weapons are defense-
oriented based on geostrategic position and the location of nuclear weapons. The 
same can be applied to the AI realm, though it instantly favors offense, due to tactical 
and operational considerations; the vulnerability of both nuclear and AI weapons, in 
addition to high exposure of critical infrastructure through cyberattacks. In 
conclusion, deterrence could be effective in today’s world.     
 
In addition to technology, geography and various capabilities, the power to hurt is an 
integral element of deterrence as Thomas Schelling elaborated that the power to hurt 
is a sort of diplomacy that makes threats credible since it is measured by the degree of 
suffering and pain that could be inflicted upon a rival, (Schelling, 2008).  It basically 
rests on the use of latent violence and the infliction or the withholding of pain, 
(Schelling, 2008). This further indicates that deterrence requires the defender to 
communicate with the defector about possible course of actions in case of 
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noncompliance while not necessitating to haphazardly leave the course of war to 
chance, otherwise, destructive war will erupt. Comparable to latent nuclear deterrence 
which is grounded on a state’s intention to reduce the time required for producing a 
nuclear bomb, and nuclear latency which is based on the capabilities, (Fuhrmann, 
2018) AI could be latent since AI proliferation is expected not to end and rivals would 
seek more capabilities, as well as the fact that cyber capabilities could inflict pain 
upon the defender and could also be a credible threat.  In addition to that, R&D 
expenditure and the production of enormous commercial and medical applications 
could be signs of latent violence since rival states can convey ultimatums through 
steady progress in AI technologies.  
 
This argument nullifies the IR literature’s suggestion of “deterrence by denial” which 
deters the adversary from acquiring further capabilities.  It is almost impossible to 
deter a state from possessing AI or cyber capabilities amid the ongoing arms race and 
the increasing asymmetry. Past incidents in nuclear deterrence accentuate the efficacy 
of deterrence by punishment as opposed to deterrence by denial, as it was the case in 
the Israeli strike against Iraq’s nuclear arsenal. While deterrence by denial is the 
favored option of small states, it failed to dissuade great powers from developing 
more weapons. That is why, Paul Davis introduced dissuasion by denial as a 
replacement of deterrence by denial. He claimed that dissuasion by denial pertains the 
calculation of potential repercussions of carrying out an attack based on expected 
value and worst/best-case scenario, (Davis, 2014). To this end, the defector should be 
informed of the positive outcomes of de-escalation and vice versa. Therefore, AI 
deterrence could be a mosaic of latent violence and dissuasion by denial. This retells 
the Cuban Missile Crisis when deterrence by punishment along with concessions and 
assurances prevented the outbreak of a destructive war.  However, latent violence and 
punishment will be the core of AI deterrence.   
 
The cognitive theory/prospect theory of deterrence, which was coined by Jeffrey 
Bekejikian, provides a suitable model for evaluating threats from highly credible to 
highly incredible. Hence, this scale would definitely guide decision-makers to make 
the right decisions based on actual capabilities and accurate calculation of costs and 
precise assessment of threats’ credibility, (Bekejikian, 2002). Such a scaling of threats 
that is based on the variants of coercive diplomacy, presented by Alexander George, 
which includes classic ultimatums that integrate three main elements: a demand, sense 
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of urgency and threat of punishment; tacit ultimatums that succeed when conveyed 
deliberately and effectively, or positive assurances/concessions, (George, 2009), 
would help the defector in calculating the credibility of threats. When it applies to the 
AI sphere, rivals would mutually deter each other not only because of uncertainty and 
credibility of threats, but also the fact that neither of them would gamble the status 
quo even when the estimated outcomes of defection are higher than the status quo, 
(Bekejikian, 2002).  
 
It is also significant to study the psychological factor in the decision-making process 
since AI requires humans to be out of the loop. The psychological aspect contributed 
to the effectiveness of deterrence as it was the case in nuclear deterrence, precisely the 
Cuban Missile Crisis which was an ideal example of general deterrence that 
exemplifies rivals’ satisfactions with the status quo. The psychological aspect would 
be non-existent in AI to AI interactions. This tells that AI could be disadvantageous in 
crisis management as some crisis require more time to be resolved diplomatically, (AI 
and the Military, 2019). This further implies AI to AI interactions could increase the 
probability of war that might produce unexpected outcomes, thereby increasing 
uncertainty and yielding strategic surprises, (AI and the Military, 2019). Such an 
observation is based on the embryonic capabilities of AI military applications and the 
mainstreamed assumption about the impossibility of developing AI applications 
capable of analyzing and reporting all diplomatic endeavors and efforts, (AI and the 
Military, 2019). Theoretically speaking, this conclusion is convincing, but practically 
speaking, it tackled the issue from one angle and overlooked the other angle which is 
the participation of humans in strategic decision-making. When humans are over-the-
loop, in spite of the high potential of data manipulation and errors, the psychological 
factor would be prominent in the anticipated AI deterrence. The IR literature 
regrettably overlooked all possibilities and scenarios while investigating the effects of 
technological advancement on security. 
 
Hence, AI could exacerbate the security dilemma amid the ongoing arms race in the 
commercial sphere, banning AI, as some scholars suggested, is highly unlikely. The 
literature has debated over the legality of AI weapons and the potentiality of banning 
AI itself or solely banning AI in military applications.  As Glaser claimed cooperation 
is possible under the security dilemma when offense-defense variables are segregated 
and when states have knowledge about motives and intentions of an adversary, 
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(Glaser, 1997). The IR literature should cooperate with the AI literature to regulate 
R&D in AI, on one hand and to lay out a legal framework for governing AI in 
military applications, on the other. Although, drafting an NPT-like agreement or 
regulating it is very hard to achieve, Glaser argued that drafting arms control 
agreements is the best desirable solution, (Glaser, 1997) given that they would 
promote mutual restraints, (Glaser, 1997).  
 
Since AI is currently seen as a new frontier for Weapons of Mass Destruction, it is 
worth considering whether a scenario of Mutually Assured Destruction could evolve, 
and whether, like during the Cold War and the post-Cold War, mutual kill via AI 
(Jervis, 2009), would lead to deterrence or intensify tensions between superpowers, 
(Lebow et al, 1995).   
 
Kenneth Waltz’s argument, which sees that nuclear deterrence focuses on the ability 
to cause damage to the aggressor rather completely defeating it concurs with Jervis 
and Schelling’s views of nuclear deterrence, (Waltz, 2009). Despite Kenneth’s 
viewpoint regarding the elimination of the essentials of war-fighting on account of 
nuclear deterrence is worthy of consideration, (Waltz, 2009) his argument about the 
elimination of the elements of defense was misleading given that nuclear weapons 
have made mutual fear intense. As Jervis noted nuclear deterrence has created general 
stability due to the alterations in political values of wars and the advert changes in 
states’ perceptions, intentions and motivations, (Jervis, 2009). General stability, 
therefore, ascertains that nuclear weapons may help in maintaining peace between 
rivals by dissuading them to overturn the status quo even when they have the 
motivation, (Jervis, 2009).  In addition, general stability has negated the view saying 
that nuclear weapons did not preclude non-nuclear states to carry out escalatory acts, 
(Quackenbush, 2011). The opponents of nuclear deterrence have disregarded how the 
imbalance of power exacerbates the security dilemma. This additionally manifests 
that nuclear superiority is a destabilizing factor and does not guarantee a decisive 
military victory, (Mohan, 1989). Hence, nuclear deterrence, in contrast to the views of 
staunch opponents of deterrence, has proved to be empirically fruitful because it has 
precluded enormously destructive wars and has maintained stability in times of 
conflicts and peacetime.  
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Given that Mutually Assured Destruction, an offshoot of nuclear deterrence, was 
acclaimed by IR scholars, AI-MAD could be a workable strategy since the literature 
debates over the applicability of MAD in the cyber sphere.  
 
The chief essence of MAD is the vulnerability of both sides to retaliation with the 
possibility of launching a second-strike capability, (Mohan, 1989). Therefore, such 
mutual vulnerability and mutual fears had contributed to the success of general 
deterrence when the Cuban Missile Crisis erupted by pushing the leaders of the two 
superpowers towards a settlement rather than pushing them to a severe confrontation, 
(Lebow, 1995). Accordingly, the more nuclear capabilities, the higher possibility of 
effective deterrence since each side will be deterred due to the uncertainty over the 
devastating consequences of a second-strike, (Mohan, 1986). The use of general 
deterrence at the peak of the Cuban Missile Crisis attributed to the prevention of a 
catastrophe as it influenced the risk of war. This further implies that deterrence was 
rather effective because of the asymmetry of interests and nuclear parity rather than 
nuclear superiority, (Lebow, 1995). This likewise proves that deterrence is a viable 
strategy since it promotes leaders to refrain from war and to accept the status quo 
when it is proved to be the best-case scenario.  
 
Therefore, the AI literature should posit how a Cuban Missile Crisis similar incident 
in the AI could happen and what could generate mutual fears: would it be mutual 
disruption of cities, machines, cyber systems or overkill? The Cuban Missile Crisis 
was between two superpowers but if a Cuban Missile Crisis incident took place at the 
regional level, would asymmetry in technology promote regional adversaries gone AI-
MAD? Since the psychological factor played a crucial role in the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, could human intervene in a state’s offset strategy to assist AI weapons and 
killer robots to pinpoint the right targets when it applies to the AI realm? The AI 
literature should also investigate the implications of AI when humans are out-of-the-
loop and when they are over-the-loop, as well as identifying which scenario would be 
the most destructive since MAD is centered on “the indivisibility of control”, 
(Fairbanks, 2004). In addition to that, the AI literature should make a comparable 
study on the implications of AI and the severity of the security dilemma based on a 
state’s dependence on technology and a state’s military capabilities.  
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While the term “Mutually Assured Deletion/Delibitation” has become trendy in the IR 
literature, some argued that the first-strike is favorable in the cyber realm. So, if the 
first-strike becomes a preferable option and offense is dominant in the cyber sphere, 
AI-MAD could be a substitute for the so-called “Mutually Assured 
Deletion/Delebitation” since massive destruction could be the logical outcome either 
through the eruption of a conventional war, cyber warfare or even a nuclear war. 
Though Fairbanks proclaimed that “damage limitation” was not the main goal of 
nuclear MAD, (Fairbanks, 2004), today’s MAD could be overwhelmed by “damage 
limitation” since current capabilities have surpassed human control. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that AI regulations should not be merely concerned with 
the damage limitation since the severity of damage could be grimmer, as opposed to 
other types of warfare.   
 
The superiority of AI capabilities over cyber ones is also debatable. Some argued that 
AI capabilities could overturn cyber ones since they could discover vulnerabilities in 
other cyber defense systems and exploit them, (Horowitz et al, 2018). The flipside of 
utilizing AI capabilities is enhancing a state’s cyber defense system by patching 
vulnerabilities in its own cybersecurity systems, thereby protecting its system from 
AI-enabled cyberattacks, (Horowitz et al, 2018). By the same token, AI could tighten 
disinformation by disseminating fake propaganda at a large scale, and could also 
counter disinformation through the utilization of bots and algorithms for detecting, 
analyzing, disrupting, vetting, blocking and filtering false/unauthentic data, (Horowitz 
et al, 2018). AI would be an effective tool for intelligence by gathering a tremendous 
amount of data, albeit it could be vulnerable to counter AI-spoofing, (Horowitz et al, 
2018). Thus, AI triggers the security dilemma and demonstrates “mutual 
vulnerability”, which further implies that defense could be dominant. This further 
illustrates that self-deterrence would be successful since weaker actors can 
circumvent disparities by using other capabilities and inflicting a political pain, 
(Wasser et al, 2018). This, additionally, demonstrates that offense could be dominant 
in case of disparity and the lack of nuclear capabilities.  
 
Besides to mutual vulnerability and collateral damage, AI-MAD is highly plausible 
since AI applications could have strategic implications over a state’s military, 
economic and information superiority, as well as its nuclear superiority. AI-enabled 
applications would change the balance of power between developed and developing 
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countries, notably with the mammoth utilization of the 3D printing technology (which 
is also known as additive manufacturing {AM}) that will facilitate the development of 
highly disruptive and speedy technologies, and will accelerate weapons proliferation, 
(Johnston et al, 2018). Since Additive Manufacturing is a cheap technology and has 
the ability to replicate its applications, (Johnston et al, 2018), AI arms race would be 
accelerated. AI MAD is not improbable since machine takeover with its four possible 
scenarios could aggravate the security dilemma particularly for networked societies, 
(Bouskill et al, 2018).  
 
Resembling to nuclear MAD, the foundations of the anticipated AI-MAD could 
include: (i) the indivisibility of control, (ii) mutual fears of retaliation, (iii) severe 
destruction, (iv) the psychological factor, (v) parity/disparity, (vi) sparing, (vii) latent 
force and (viii) error. Corresponding to cyber MAD, the cores of the propositioned AI 
MAD could include: (i) attribution, (ii) costs and (iv) degree of dependence on 
technology. Opposed to nuclear and cyber MAD, AI MAD could also investigate the 
roles of humans and machines in a military’s command and control.  
  
To sum up, the literature should focus on the potential destructiveness of AI amid the 
massive use of cyber capabilities; find ways to ameliorate the security dilemma, and it 
should also consider if MAD applies to AI technology.  
 
Conceptual Framework: 
 
Since both cyber and IR literature claim that cyber threats could overcome AI 
capabilities, this paper will build upon the argument supporting the overpowering 
potential and future prospects of AI while considering the arguments that discredit the 
potentialities of AI applications versus cyber capabilities. This paper will explore the 
possible implications of AI on both cyber and nuclear capabilities. It will also tackle 
the direct proportion between both cyber-offensive and cyber-defensive capabilities, 
and nuclear capabilities in relation to AI capabilities.  
 
The Security Dilemma Triad:  
 
 
 
AI Capabilities  
Nuclear Capabilities  Cyber Capabilities  
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Towards this end, this paper develops a “Security Dilemma Triad” composing of 
three main elements: cyber, AI, and nuclear capabilities. Based on the security 
dilemma triad, this paper will address the relationship between AI and cyber 
capabilities on the one hand, and the relationship between AI and nuclear capabilities 
on the other, as well as the relationship between nuclear and cyber capabilities with 
the presence of AI capabilities. 
 
 
Therefore, four possible scenarios will be developed to investigate whether offense or 
defense will be dominant as follows:  
(A) When a state possesses nuclear capabilities + AI capabilities + cyber 
capabilities = defense is dominant;  
(B) When a state does not possess nuclear capabilities, but possesses AI 
capabilities + cyber capabilities = offense is dominant;  
(C) When a state possesses nuclear capabilities + cyber capabilities but does not 
possess AI capabilities = defense is dominant;  
(D) When a state possesses nuclear capabilities + AI capabilities but lacks cyber 
capabilities = defense is dominant.  
 
This paper presumes that defense is dominant under the first scenario given that AI 
capabilities can overcome cyber capabilities, thereby disavowing the argument of 
nuclear vulnerability against cyberattacks. Following the second scenario, offense is 
dominant given that nuclear deterrence is ineffective or absent, while AI capabilities 
could empower cyber capabilities by attacking points of weakness in the cyber 
system. Under the third scenario, defense is also dominant, in spite of the lack of AI 
capabilities, due to nuclear deterrence. Finally, for the fourth scenario, defense is 
dominant because a state possesses nuclear weapons that maintain a second-strike 
capability.     
 
The rationale behind developing the abovementioned scenarios and the “Security 
Dilemma Triangle/Triad” is questioning how AI could change states’ perceptions in 
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terms of cyber and nuclear capabilities/doctrines. It will, initially, investigate the AI 
offense-defense dominance. Then, the implications of AI on both the cyber/nuclear 
offense-defense dominance will be covered. It will subsequently borrow the elements 
of nuclear Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) (please see annex 1) as variables.  
 
AI Offense Defense Dominance:  
It is logic to start with exploring the dominance of either offense or defense in the AI 
realm before investigating the prospects of an AI MAD. By virtue of the declining 
role of humans in the AI sphere, it is prudent to hypothesize two scenarios for the 
application of AI in the military sphere: (i) humans have a minimal control over AI 
applications; (ii) human supervision over AI applications is absent. Based on that, this 
piece presumes that AI favors a second-strike capability, (Schneider, 2018). 
Notwithstanding, the impossibility of defining a machine’s accountability in violation 
of the Law of Armed Conflicts and the Geneva Conventions makes an offensive AI 
strike advantageous.  This does not necessarily mean that offense is dominant in AI. 
On the contrary, defense is dominant in AI when humans maintain control over 
machines. On the other hand, AI could favor offense when human control is 
absent and when a military’s command and control is digitally-dependent on 
cyber capabilities.    
 
The Implications of AI in Terms of the Element of MAD: 
Based on that conclusion, the following section will cover the implications of AI on 
both nuclear and cyber capabilities in order to investigate the offense-defense 
dominance in the abovementioned scenarios:  
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Drawing on the above mentioned, the possession of other sorts of military 
capabilities, such as conventional, nuclear and cyber, in tandem with AI ones helps 
states to take the situation from different angles. These angles could be: (i) AI 
capabilities have no implications over other capabilities and vice versa, (ii) other 
capabilities could bolster a state’s position when it possesses highly advanced AI 
software and applications, (iii) other types of military capabilities are valuable, if a 
state possesses amateur AI software, or (iv) other military capabilities are invaluable, 
if a state possesses advanced AI applications. This in turn helps states to see if small 
AI arsenals could create a MAD-like structure with the possession of other military 
capabilities. Perhaps, small AI arsenals could deter states from launching a 
preemptive or preventive strike.   
 
Hereafter, the paper supposes that mutual AI deterrence could be established between 
two nuclear states. While, asymmetric deterrence might operate between a non-
nuclear state and a nuclear state since the non-nuclear state would be deterred from 
launching a first military strike because of the adversary’s superiority with the 
possession of nuclear and fully autonomous AI applications. Though, it might employ 
asymmetric capabilities instead to deter its adversary from launching a preemptive AI 
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or a conventional strike. For the superior state, it could resort to offensive warfighting 
rather than depleting its nuclear arsenal that could be neutralized by AI.   
 
Methodology: 
To explore the potential impact of AI on the security dilemma, I interviewed policy 
makers, and experts in the field, in addition to an extensive review of the secondary 
literature on the weaponization of AI. 
Interviews included: personal and phone interviews with a security expert/military 
advisor, two university professors, two ambassadors and a researcher as follows:  
(i) Dr/General Mahmoud Khalaf, advisor at Nasser Military Academy; 
(ii) Dr Dalal Mahmoud Al-Sayed, a professor of political science at Faculty of 
economic and Political Science at Cairo University and Nasser Military 
Academy; 
(iii) Dr Waleed Rashad, assistant professor at the National Center for Social 
and Criminological Research; 
(iv) Ambassador Karim Haggag, professor of practice at the American 
University in Cairo;  
(v) Ambassador Aly Erfan; Program Director at the School of Global Affairs 
and Public Policy at the American University in Cairo; 
(vi) Mona Soliman, doctoral candidate at the Faculty of economic and Political 
Science at Cairo University and a researcher at International Politics 
Journal (Al-Siyasa Al-Dawleeya).    
Variables and Investigation Methods: (please see annex2) 
To investigate the four scenarios mentioned in the conceptual framework, the 
dependent variables include: dependence on technology, sparing, latent 
violence and the demonstrative aspect, expected utility and cost-benefit 
analysis, calculus of war, balance of power, relatively of power and 
comparison of military and non-military capabilities, parity/disparity, margin of 
error, levels of communication, intentions, scope of human role in the 
decision-making process, degree of control over machines, indivisibility of 
command and control systems, attribution and counterforce.  In addition, 
geography and population will be considered to see their impacts on a state‟s 
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strategic depth. These dependent variables will help in observing variations 
based on the two independent variables which are: (i) human-over-the-loop, 
(De Spiegeleire, S et al) and (ii) human-out-of-the-loop, (Russell S. J et al, 
2010). Accordingly, it hypothesized two scenarios for AI deterrence, as either 
successful or failed, based on the degree of human control over machines, 
the degree of dependence on technology and the impacts of AI applications 
on nuclear and cyber policies.  
   
Findings: 
What is Artificial Intelligence? 
The definition of Artificial Intelligence is originated from the definition of 
intelligence which is defined as an agent’s computational ability to perform tasks and 
achieve goals in different environment. Based on that, Artificial Intelligence is 
defined as a machine’s ability to replicate humans’ mental skills and behaviors, 
namely pattern recognition, reasoning and neuro-linguistic programming (NLP), and 
to learn by experience, as well as being able to adapt to environment and changes, (De 
Spiegeleire, S, et al). The US Defense Science Board defined AI as the computation 
of tasks such as decision-making, perception and conversation, which are used to be 
exclusively done by humans, (De Spiegeleire, S, et al). Such a definition of AI 
illustrates that computation and automation are associated with thought processes, 
reasoning, behaviors, ideals, and fidelity and dependability of human performance, 
(Russell et al, 2010).  
Thus, the core of AI technology is the mimicry of human characteristics 
autonomously, (Tweedie, 2017). AI technology entails (i) expert systems, (ii) 
machine learning, (iii) natural-language processing, and (iv) AI planning, (Tweedie, 
2018).    
 
The AI literature has generated three types of AI, mirroring the evolution of AI 
throughout the past decades: (i) Artificial Narrow Intelligence (ANI): It is a sort of 
technology that mimics a narrow range of human behavior/intelligence. It is a 
sophisticated technology, albeit it cannot develop codes; (ii) Artificial General 
Intelligence (AGI): It is a more sophisticated technology as opposed to Narrow 
Artificial Intelligence since it emulates a wider range of human behaviors. It is a type 
of technology that mimics human intelligence as if they are made by humans; (iii) 
Artificial Super Intelligence (ASI): It transcends human intelligence, (Tweedie, 
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2017). Artificial Super Intelligence, as per AI developers’ speculations, is expected to 
nullify and end the exclusivity of human intelligence, (Tweedie, 2018).        
 
The Possible Implications of AI on Other Military Capabilities (Nuclear and Cyber): 
 
A. Cyber Capabilities:  
Cyber capabilities are a sort of capabilities and assets that a state can possess to use 
them in the conventional, commercial, nuclear, logistical, military and etc to resist 
possible attacks or project influence in cyberspace, (Craig, 2018). Both defensive and 
offensive capabilities shape a state’s influence since they can be employed as active 
or latent, (Craig, 2018). 
 
Today’s cybersecurity systems’ challenges and vulnerabilities are manifold. 
Cybersecurity systems are usually attacked through a chain of attacks starting with the 
reconnaissance, weaponizing, the delivery phase and ending with the exploit phase, 
(Wirkuttis et al, 2017). What is more important, the challenges associated with 
gathering cyber intelligence, inter alia, the need to constant adaptation with the 
massive amount of heterogeneous data that flows exponentially; the inadequacy of 
intrusion detection prevention systems that either defines malware by detecting 
abnormal patterns or outlines patterns of normal and recognized networks, (Wirkuttis 
et al, 2017).   
 
Based on such a cursory investigation, offense seems dominant, according to the 
tenets of the classical offense-defense theory, for plenteous reasons, of which, the 
constant progress in offensive capabilities over defensive ones and the increasing 
defensive vulnerabilities, (Locatelli, 2013), including the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of data, (Abel Moneim, 2018) as well as the asymmetric nature of 
cyberwarfare, (Lindsay, 2013). Resembling to nuclear ambiguity, constructive 
ambiguity is a chief essence of cyber warfare, (Al-Daweek, 2018). But with the 
massive production of AI applications, such a conclusion needs further investigation 
since AI could sharpen or mitigate the cybersecurity dilemma which refers to the use 
of offensive, defensive or commingled cyber tools by states amid the absence of 
shared cyber norms, (Hennessey, 2017). By the same token, the weaponization of Big 
Data and the usage of off-the-shelf technology also tighten the cybersecurity dilemma 
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since governments have opportunity to create databases of every single member in the 
opponents’ militaries, (Layton, 2018).  
  
The utilization of AI capabilities in the cyber realm has two poles. AI with its 
predictability and automation, could mitigate the cyber security dilemma and could 
enhance cyber defense by addressing underlying challenges and vulnerabilities in the 
cyber ecosystem. Thus, AI capabilities would enhance the effectiveness of the 
Integrated Security Approach” (ISA); a holistic approach encompasses early-
warnings; the selection and the adoption of the most adequate countermeasures to 
deter possible cyberattacks; the detection of potential attacks in case of failing to 
prevent a cyberattack, and adequate responses, (Wirkuttis et al, 2017).  AI, with its 
offensive and defensive capabilities, has exhibited its ability to enhance cybersecurity 
by pinpointing and patching inherent vulnerabilities in cyber defense systems, while 
probing, manipulating and spoofing those of adversaries, (King et al, 2018), as well as 
detecting software bugs and performing responsive and defensive actions such as self-
patching, thereby deterring cyberattacks at early stages, (Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
Enabled Cyber Defense). 
 
While, the negative pole of AI is exemplified in a new bunch of AI applications 
capable of evading cyber defense systems and remaining dormant till detecting their 
targets, such as the Stuxnet, (Menn, 2018), as well as masking the identity of a 
malware after observing and figuring out how adversarial defense systems detect 
malware and malicious codes and what they are detecting, (Goosen et al, 2018). Also, 
data diet and algorithms biasness are archetypically the Cassandra of misbehaving 
algorithms, (Osoba et al, 2017). Heavy reliance on robots and technology increase 
warriors’ vulnerability to information attacks by spoofing, denial-of-service, 
eavesdropping and exploitation, (Kott et al, 2015).  
 
Ostensibly, the use of AI in the cyber realm is a double-edged sword. It enhances 
cyber security and cyber deterrence, at the meantime it intensifies cyber proliferation. 
The proliferation of advanced cyber capabilities could serve a state’s strategic 
purposes through coercion, and could be useful for employing brute force which helps 
a state to achieve its purposes at the tactical level through kinetic or non-kinetic 
cyberattacks, (Liff, 2012). Cyberattacks allow states to extract meaningful 
concessions from adversaries, undermining their abilities to retaliate or defend 
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themselves with conventional or cyber capabilities, (Liff, 2012). On the backdrop of 
this vignette, the threat of cyberwarfare, coupled with AI capabilities, could be an 
expedient deterrent tool and a practical brute force measure against superior 
adversaries that possess highly advanced conventional weapons, (Liff, 2012). Also, 
AI proliferation deter states in the cyber plane since every single application has its 
counter application, (Rashad, 2019) thereby making it useless.  
 
AI, despite boosting cyber defense, states employs AI with varying degrees for cyber 
deterrence, (Rashad, 2019). Hence, the aim of preemptive cyber deterrence, in certain 
cases, is demonstrating the ability to disrupt or penetrate security systems rather than 
inflicting complete destruction, and having access to sensitive data, (Rashad, 2019). 
This illustrates that cyber deterrence is usually based on calculus.   
 
b) Nuclear Capabilities:  
 
The rapid advancement in AI raises a question over the survivability and the 
resilience of nuclear systems; the ability to resist or circumvent attacks and the 
aptitude to penetrate defenses of nuclear arsenals, (Payne et al, 2017) The mundane 
marriage between AI and nuclear weapons coupled with full autonomy and the 
absence of human from nuclear decision-making is two-folded. It might upend the 
subtle strategic balance among nuclear states, (Groll, 2018), triggering catastrophic 
repercussions and cascading tensions between nuclear states on one hand and a non-
nuclear state and a nuclear one, on the other.  
 
The cons of AI capabilities on nuclear deterrence involve the vulnerability of nuclear 
weapons to robust models of cyber-enabled attacks aimed at disrupting machine 
learning, thereby undermining their survivability, (Brown, 2018). Such a tragic flaw 
in the AI system, while providing opportunities for mitigating cyber vulnerabilities, 
could also undermine nuclear safety and reliability since nuclear weapons depend on 
real-time information exchange for targeting, (Unal, 2018). Further, full automation 
wherein humans are out-of-the-loop would definitely have knock-on implications on 
strategic stability, cascading escalatory acts and triggering arms race, (Unal, 2018). 
On account of automation and the digitalization of militaries, false assessments and 
responses by algorithms inserted in nuclear weapons systems, which could be labelled 
as machine error, could create operational hazards notably for digitally-independent 
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states that would make wrongful decisions based on unreliable and inaccurate data, 
(Unal, 2018). Critically important, AI could make the “no first use” policy of less 
merit because of accidental errors, (Boulanin, 2018).  
  
There are arrays of risks associated with the digitalization of nuclear command and 
control systems (C2) which include the possibility of disrupting means of 
communication, thus putting the reliability of data assessment on a shaky ground, 
(Unal, 2018). In a similar way, the Integrated Threat warning/Assessment structure 
which depends on a number of nodes, namely intelligence centers, the missile 
warning center, ground-and-space-based assets, could be irreliable since the means of 
communication could be compromised and manipulated, (Unal, 2018). “AI could 
undermine system stability (C2 and early-warning)”, (Haggag, 2019). It could also 
“undermine nuclear strategic stability because of its asymmetrical way” by 
undermining its physical system that supports a nuclear command and control system, 
(Haggag, 2019).  
 
A striking claim forestalls that AI could sharpen the nuclear second-strike capability. 
Despite its peculiarity, it could be true, according to an expert on general adversarial 
networks, when states resort to adversarial manipulation attacks for dissuading 
adversaries from tracking their nuclear arsenals, (Giest et al, 2018).   
 
Correspondingly to the pros of AI to cyber deterrence, AI could tighten nuclear 
weapon systems by boosting detection capabilities, improving early-warning systems, 
empowering humans to carry out a precise cross-analysis of data, as well as protecting 
the nuclear command and control architecture, (Boulanin, 2018). In line with this, a 
group of participants in a workshop organized by RAND argued that AI might 
address underlying frailties in the nuclear arms control regime and might lay out 
novel foundations of arms control, (Giest et al, 2018).   
 
Paradoxically, it could intensify arms race and could push nuclear states to modernize 
their nuclear arsenals due to escalatory acts by nuclear and non-nuclear states, 
(Boulanin, 2018).  
 
C) Nuclear Versus Cyber:  
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From a technical perspective, cyber capabilities menace nuclear weapons since 
cyberattacks could agile nuclear command and control when it is unprotected and 
when cyber resilience is not effective, coupled with human error and fallibility.  In 
addition, AI, through adversarial manipulation, could send false signals or transfer 
fake information to counter cyberattacks on nuclear facilities. Still, AI helps improve 
defense systems, including the nuclear ones.   
 
The paramount argument saying that AI might undermine nuclear deterrence and 
trigger nuclear war needs to be revisited. On contrary, from a purely technical view, 
AI capabilities could overturn cyber vulnerabilities and mitigate their negative side 
effects on nuclear capabilities, if they are well-protected, (Al-Sayed, 2019) and highly 
advanced. Dr/General Mahmoud Khalaf; Nasser Academy Military advisor, asserted 
that AI has nothing to do with nuclear deterrence.  Yet, he acknowledged the negative 
impacts of AI on nuclear command and control systems, counterforce and 
survivability from a technical angle.  Thus, based on political realities, cyber 
capabilities have failed to revoke nuclear deterrence.  
 
Nuclear vulnerabilities put states under a dilemma of pursuing cyber offense or cyber 
defense. Such a dilemma is a normal byproduct of the inherent uncertainty over the 
survivability and the reliability of nuclear systems that could be silently compromised 
and infiltrated through dormant and stealth campaigns. Therefore, a state may be 
incognizant of, in times of peace, the infiltration of its nuclear system for days, 
months or years which in turn deleteriously affects its military decision-making, 
deterrence policy, security doctrine, (Unal, 2018) and nuclear posture.  In times of 
war, the situation is quite different given that it may result in information asymmetry, 
thereby triggering a retaliatory attack based on faulty calculations, (Unal, 2018).  
 
In response, the emergence of AI technology could ameliorate such a dilemma by its 
detective and predicative capabilities. AI, as an assistive tool, could help leaders to 
make righteous decisions. Also, cyber intrusion, hacking of critical nuclear facilities 
and system failures are very common in nuclear weapons systems, (Unal, 2018). As a 
result, states would be dissuaded from using cyber capabilities due to the uncertainty 
over the degree of advancement as opposed to their adversaries. Correspondingly, 
attackers would be dissuaded from attacking adversarial nuclear arsenals. This 
illustrates, as Dr Waleed Rashad; assistant professor at the National Center for Social 
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and Criminological Research, humans are critical in nuclear policy as they act as 
rational beings, (Rashad, 2019).  
 
AI + Cyber + Nuclear: 
To sum up, technical-wise, AI could undermine nuclear deterrence, especially when 
humans are absent, but politically speaking, the AI technology cannot overturn 
nuclear deterrence as long as there is a meaningful degree of human control.   
 
Analysis: 
Even with the lack of empirical evidences of the destructive potentials of AI military 
applications, defining AI is a requisite for investigating how it would reshape 
interstate relations and how it would alter the foundations of the international peace 
system.  
 
The IR scholars and international lawyers have narrowly focused on the destructive 
potentials of AI and its autonomous potentials without defining its nature. They, 
regrettably, mixed up between AI as a technology, precisely as an enabler of a 
weapon, and AI as a weapon system per se. They mistakenly assumed that AI can 
serve “as a state weapon”, (Haggag, 2019). In fact, “AI is not a weapon”, (Erfan, 
2019), but a technology that can be bolted into a weapon system and that “can serve 
as an enabler for cyber and conventional weapons, as well as weapons of mass 
destruction”, (Haggag, 2019). It will be very problematic to categorize AI as a 
weapon given that equating AI with other weapon systems, such as conventional and 
nuclear weapons, would definitely direct the literature to exploring the impacts of AI 
per se, while disregarding the possible impacts of AI military applications on other 
weapon systems. Hypothetically speaking, if AI had been classified as a weapon, not 
a technology, states would have heavily relied on AI, with its highly destructive and 
disruptive potentials and its cost-benefit effects, for achieving military targets.  
Therefore, the weaponization of AI refers to “the development in the uses of 
weapons”, (Khalaf, 2019).      
 
Based on this definition, the weaponization of AI “exacerbates the security dilemma 
because it can enhance the military capability of a state in symmetric relations or it 
can increase the military disparity between states not only in terms of new capability, 
but also in terms of attribution” coupled with the potential of being weaponized by 
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non-state actors, (Haggag, 2019). Apart from the legal aspect, the security dilemma 
does not only augment because of parity/disparity in capabilities, but also the 
uncertainty over “the impacts of using AI on military’s decision-making and the 
calculus of war”, (Erfan, 2019). Adding to this, uncertainty over AI applications’ 
ability to counter-react and respond in the event of sudden attacks, regardless of being 
intentional or unintentional, is the core of the security dilemma in the age of 
technology.  
 
There is no doubt that the use of AI for military purposes will dramatically change the 
calculus of war. Referring to the excessive reliance on drones in lieu of humans for 
reducing the number of causalities, Ambassador Aly Erfan sees that AI or any 
technological advancement “would make the decision to go to war easy”, (Erfan, 
2019). Though, such a view point is partially true at first glance, it omits that 
technological advancement could make causalities higher and could also make the 
outcomes graver. The use of nuclear weapons during the second World War in 1945 
was a perfect example illustrating how technological advancement could be highly 
destructive and could trigger high death tolls. This tells destructive outcomes always 
dissuade states from rushing into war. And, the whole issue is not only about 
causalities, but also cost-benefit effects, interstate relations, legal considerations, state 
responsibility, military strength, degree of advancement in technology, geography, 
parity/disparity in capabilities, strategic climate, etc. More importantly, mutual 
vulnerability, indecisive victory, (Khalaf, 2019) escalatory acts and retaliation are also 
foundational in war calculus. The use of AI in militaries adds a new criterion to war 
calculus which is the utility of using AI as an enabler of a certain weapon system.  
 
AI in air defense systems is one area to consider how AI could enhance or undermine 
the effectiveness of a weapons system. From a purely military perspective, 
commanders could assess how would AI allow them to employ air defense systems 
effectively and how would it allow them to maneuver and respond in a timely fashion. 
AI, for instance, minimizes the time needed for a response from 2 minutes, when 
humans are on-the-loop, to 10-20 seconds, when humans are no longer on the loop, 
(Khalaf, 2019). As Dr./General Mahmoud Khalaf said, the whole issue is about 
choosing and using the most adequate weapon for ensuring a speedy response. In 
other words, a states’ commanders should know the type of the weapon used by the 
adversary, and should use the most appropriate weapon to respond within no time, 
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(Khalaf, 2019). Therefore, a dichotomy does exist between the ability to identify and 
detect the advanced weapon used by an adversary, and the ability to respond 
effectively and in no time by using the appropriate means/weapons, (Khalaf, 2019). 
Therefore, AI and emerging technologies would not make the decision to war easy.  
 
The absence of a threshold for incidents that could be seen as an act of aggression in 
the cyber domain, (Erfan, 2019) coupled with the AI’s “dual-use nature and the 
potential of weaponizing AI civilian applications”, (Haggag, 2019) further 
exacerbates the cyber security dilemma. The dual-use nature of AI could enable an 
adversary to manipulate a civilian AI application and change its nature, so as to be 
employed for military purposes. As a consequence, the AI security dilemma would be 
exacerbated since a state’s commanders and soldiers should be aware of a weapon’s 
capability and technology in order to be able to respond effectively. In that case, the 
problematic issue of attribution looms over since the defender might be unable to 
recognize the real nature of an AI application.  
 
Since AI is typically a development in the use of technology in the military realm, one 
could say that it is two-folded given it could enhance both cyber defense and cyber 
deterrence, (Rashad, 2019) and could undermine the nuclear policy. Meanwhile, there 
is no a determinant proof. Hereafter, as Ambassador Erfan implied, the degree 
through which an AI application controls a weapon system is critical in a state’s 
calculations. 
 
Most of scholarly debate assumed the inapplicability of cyber deterrence for ample 
reasons: (i) cyber space is an open battlefield, thereby it does not exacerbate the 
security dilemma, (Al-Sayed, 2019); (ii) the absence of internet governance, (Erfan, 
2019). It is true that the absence of internet governance and the difficulty of 
establishing attribution, notably when the attacker wants to keep his/her identity 
hidden, hinder the efficacy of cyber deterrence in its classical form.  But, by enabling 
cyber defense systems with AI applications, cyber deterrence will be effectual. From 
a technical point of view, AI enhances cyber defense by detecting vulnerabilities in 
one’s system and spoofing an adversary’s system. From a political point of view, AI 
exacerbates the security dilemma because it is an advanced version of cyber 
capabilities, allowing states to mutually penetrate sensitive systems, such as military, 
intelligence and critical infrastructure, (Rashad, 2019); collect accurate data, and to 
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“have a vivid picture of an adversary’s capabilities”, (Khalaf, 2019). It also reshapes 
the balance of power. In an effort to mitigate the cyber security dilemma, states 
employ AI, drones and robots in preemptive cyber deterrence, (Rashad, 2019) since 
the victim will unilaterally deter itself, (Lonsdale, 2017) in the event of a widespread 
disruptive cyberattack that could trigger civilian causalities.  
 
Regarding nuclear capabilities, alarmists’ view point, arguing that AI would threaten 
nuclear weapons and would undermine nuclear deterrence, dominates the IR 
literature. Theoretically speaking, this view looks awesome because “the nuclear C2 
can be violated by cyber capabilities since hackers can hack the typical system of air 
mines”, (Erfan, 2019). But, when it comes to nuclear deterrence, it needs further 
investigation. First of all, “AI could be used as an enabler in terms of nuclear policy 
which includes: targeting, command and control, early-warning, potential battle 
damage assessment and the scenarios for establishing attribution”, (Haggag, 2019). 
Therefore, from a technical angle, AI can protect nuclear weapons since some of the 
AI applications are designed for early-warning and detecting any nuclear 
proliferation.  Based on that, AI applications can assist humans and decision-makers, 
who use skills-based behaviors, in outlining the courses of action in a nuclear policy. 
In that case, nuclear deterrence will not be threatened provided that the nuclear 
command and control system is well-structured, well-protected and well-defended, 
(Erfan, 2019) as well as “defensive measures, including data encryption, are taken”, 
(Al-Sayed, 2019). Hence, it is unexpected that AI would change the defensive nuclear 
doctrine to a “preemptive” one, as Ambassador Haggag claimed, as long as humans 
are over-the-loop. Such an argument could be valid only when fully autonomous 
applications are bolted into the nuclear weapon system and when humans maintain no 
control over machines.  
  
Though, the AI technology cannot equate any of the known weapon systems, the 
devastating potentials of the AI technology can equate those of the nuclear weapons, 
(Erfan, 2019). Assuming that an AI application controls a nuclear weapon system, the 
scale of destruction will surpass the destructiveness of AI-enabled conventional 
weapons, (Erfan, 2019). This argument is convincing when humans are out-of-the-
loop.  
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As politics speak louder than technicalities, the dichotomy between nuclear weapons 
safety and highly advanced cyber capabilities could somehow be mitigated by the use 
of AI early-warning applications and a meaningful humans’ supervision.   
 
Offense Versus Defense and the Efficacy of Deterrence in the AI realm: 
Theoretically speaking, the malicious use of AI makes offense dominant in the cyber 
realm when state A has strong cyber defense systems as opposed to state B which has 
weak defense systems. There is no a unified position over the offensive/defensive 
nature of AI. Ambassador Erfan, for instance, maintained that AI deterrence could be 
feasible, though he implied the difficulty of determining whether offense or defense 
will be dominant, (Erfan, 2019). Ambassador Haggag, on the other hand, sees that 
“establishing AI deterrence will be more difficult, if not impossible”, because he sees 
that deterrence is already difficult in nuclear weapons, (Haggag, 2019). Likewise, Dr. 
Dalal Al-Sayed argued that AI deterrence is impossible because of the openness of the 
cyber realm, (Al-Sayed, 2019). Ambassador Haggag’s argument about the complex 
nature of deterrence shall be spotted-on given that deterrence is based on assumptions 
and hypothetical scenarios. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that 
deterrence is impossible in other weapon systems and emerging technologies since 
deterrence is a policy/strategy through which states devise scenarios based on the 
strategic climate for enhancing their defense. The whole issue of deterrence is “the 
political will to deter and having the ability to establish deterrence”, (Khalaf, 2019).  
 
As per the foundations of cyber deterrence, defense would be dominant in the AI 
sphere, owing to its penetrative, manipulative and disruptive potentials, (Rashad, 
2019). The ability to show muscles in the cyber/AI sphere and the ability to retaliate 
and respond in a timely manner make defense dominant.  In some cases, states resort 
to the cyber sphere and weaponize the Internet of Things (IoT) just for signaling the 
vulnerability of adversarial cyber defense systems which in turn deter victims from 
launching offensive cyberattacks. This demonstrates that signaling cyber 
vulnerabilities is deterrent in and of itself, (Rashad, 2019).   
 
AI MAD is Feasible: (Please see annex 3) 
The 20
th
 century Cold War provoked nuclear deterrence and Mutually Assured 
Destruction. By the same token, the 21th century Cold war and the intense AI race 
could make an AI MAD-like structure probable. However, such a supposition should 
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not be taken for granted given that an AI MAD could be a workable strategy only 
when humans are having a degree of control over AI applications and when they 
participate in the decision-making process, especially at the strategic level.  
 
Scenario One: Humans are out-of-the-loop:  
 
Such a scenario is highly implausible in the foreseeable future, but it should be 
considered since AI warfare will be the next war due to its little cost and its 
potentiality to trigger few physical causalities, (Soliman, 2019). Accordingly, with the 
mechanization of war, this scenario could generate graver outcomes comparable to 
the second scenario, to be discussed later. Under this scenario, humans would have no 
control over machines and they would also relinquish their monopoly over the 
military decision-making process to machines and AI applications. Thus, as Mona 
Soliman noted, machines/robots and drones would have a powerful role as opposed to 
humans in future wars, (Soliman, 2019).  And, human role would be confined to 
counting physical and human causalities, (Soliman, 2019). Furthermore, the scale of 
destruction could not be estimated and could not be mitigated or even controlled in 
case of wrongful attacks or miscalculations. There is no doubt that the use of fully 
autonomous AI applications with their high destructive capabilities and the irritability 
of C2 systems will definitely change the nature and “the purpose of war in the cyber 
sphere from trying to influence an adversary’s calculus to destroying it”, (Al-Sayed, 
2019). Thus, offense would be dominant with the absence of the psychological factor. 
This further illustrates that a vicious circle of retaliatory attacks (first- and second-
strikes) would be highly probable. Adding to this, the lack of accountability would 
further aggravate the situation amid the strict rejection of states to define a cyber 
threshold, (Erfan, 2019). Therefore, it would be hard to punish a machine or even 
preclude a state responsibility, which also means the failure of deterrence. The failure 
of deterrence and indecisive victory would be the logical outcomes since fully 
autonomous weapons would take-over other capabilities, causing severe destruction 
and disruption.  
 
The difficulty of ensuring machines’ compliance with international law and 
international legal norms, the impossibility of fathoming in advance the outcomes of 
machine-machine interactions, (Altmann et al, 2017) and the dilemma of attribution 
make deterrence more complex and spark crisis instability. Adding to such a gloomy 
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scenario, an AI system could preserve itself should it suspected that its halt was 
imminent, and could retaliate by launching a nuclear strike, thereby undermining the 
doctrine of mutually assured destruction, (Klare, 2019).  Also, the deployment of 
undersea drones might threaten the second-strike capability, (Klare, 2019).   
 
Hypothetically, the only possible way to make machine-based deterrence effective 
under such an extreme scenario is the regular updates of data and occasional oversight 
by humans. Ergo, machines are not immune from miscalculations. Under such a very 
hypothetical and far-fetched scenario, where machines are in control of fire power and 
other weapon systems, ample forms of latent violence could be used as follows: (i) 
when AI has been bolted into a nuclear weapon or a WMD, deterrence by punishment 
or retaliation would have been effectual, (Erfan, 2019); (ii) when AI has been inserted 
into a cyber defense system, deterrence by disruption would have been effective; (iii) 
when AI has been used through a conventional weapon, deterrence by punishment 
would have been plausible. If such a scenario occurred, would states’ leaders 
intervene at the end of the day? There is no a definite answer for such a question since 
we are unsure to what extent would machines be able to act like humans.  
 
Scenario Two: Humans are over-the-loop:   
 
Under this scenario, states would remain the main actor given such a highly advanced 
AI technology, especially those which are usually developed for military purposes, 
cannot be produced or even used by individuals and non-state actors, (Erfan, 2019). It 
is true that states would be the main actor under this scenario, but non-state actor, 
including companies and terrorist groups, and individuals could use and could 
produce AI applications with the technique of addictive manufacturing, as well as 
they could “weaponize” AI applications, (Haggag, 2019). Further, the potential of 
eclipsing humans’ role would be far-fetched, (Al-Sayed, 2019) since the decision to 
go to war would be under the discretion of humans. In the context of human-machine 
teaming, AI applications would be active at the tactical and operational levels and 
humans would be responsible for strategic decision-making.  
 
From a military perspective, AI deterrence is feasible, with or without the possession 
of nuclear weapons, given that states’ leaders will be reluctant to launch a first-strike 
because of the fear of unknown. Besides, the ever-intensifying AI race in the 
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commercial and military spheres aggravates the inherent dilemma of keeping up pace 
by possessing the most advanced AI applications to deter and penetrate adversaries, 
and the ability to develop national AI applications. In other words, each state should 
possess the most advanced AI applications vis-a-vis its adversary, (Khalaf, 2019). 
Unlike other conventional and unconventional military capabilities, AI applications 
should be domestically developed, thereby enhancing states’ power and influence, 
(Khalaf, 2019). AI warfare is a sort of information warfare whereby triumph always 
goes to the one who possesses more data and information, (Khalaf, 2019). AI warfare 
is new form of struggle wherewithal competing parties seek to “destroy data”, 
(Khalaf, 2019) to paralyze each other and to undermine their choices to respond.  
However, this reflects the inherent dilemma in AI-enabled warfare which requires 
possessing and collecting more data without being detected to avoid retaliatory acts 
that could take place to collect massive data in return, (Khalaf, 2019).  In the event of 
reciprocated penetration and manipulation of data, victory will be indecisive due to 
data neutralization, (Khalaf, 2019). This tells that data neutralization, coupled with the 
weaponization of Big Data, triggers neutralization at the battlefield inasmuch as 
military commanders are uncertain about the reliability of their weapon systems and 
are also unsure of weapons capabilities. This further implies that data neutralization 
can also pave the way for weapons neutralization. Therefore, weapons neutralization 
can pose a problem at the operational and tactical levels given that the defender 
should “respond effectively and in a timely fashion, as well as should choose the most 
appropriate weapon to respond”, (Khalaf, 2019).   
 
Because of neutralization and mutual vulnerability, the weaponization of AI could 
create deterrence and could maintain strategic stability in symmetric struggles. In 
asymmetric conflicts which are usually associated with crisis instability, AI 
deterrence could also be viable since cyber force and conventional military force are 
not alike, (Rashad, 2019).  Thus, by separating cyber force from other sorts of 
military force, “AI could make preemptive deterrence and defense more effective”, 
(Erfan, 2019). However, such a classification should not disregard the efficacy of 
other sorts of force. One could argue that the efficacy of cyber force could equate and 
could go hand in hand with conventional force. It is illogical to confine asymmetric 
calculus to the cyber sphere since states are rational. The purpose of deterrence in 
asymmetric struggles is usually demonstrating the ability to attack or retaliate without 
inflicting massive destruction. Coupled with traditional war calculus, a superior state 
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could adopt AI preemptive deterrence to dissuade an adversary from using AI and 
such-like capabilities maliciously, whereas, a weak state could adopt cyber deterrence 
and develop more cyber capabilities to demonstrate its ability to attack a superior 
state. To that end, the defensive doctrine would be complemented with preemption. 
Asymmetric deterrence resembles the cat and mouse game where neither the cat nor 
the mouse would be able to claim victory.  
 
In short, cost neutralization pushes states to think twice. Accordingly, AI mutually 
assured destruction-like structure is feasible since “the purpose is not destruction, but 
gaining a political benefit by making the costs of offense very high and intolerable”, 
(Khalaf, 2019).  
 
In the context of symmetric and asymmetric conflicts, the defensive doctrine would 
be dominant in the AI realm as long as humans could reduce uncertainty and they, 
more or less, could open channels of communication to avoid grave destruction of 
spared cities and avoid the total disruption of cyber systems and AI-enabled 
machines.  
 
By applying this to other weapon systems which can be enabled by AI capabilities, AI 
could maintain a second-strike capability amid the growing uncertainty over the 
collateral damage that might be triggered by the uncontrollable use of nuclear and 
conventional weapons. This further illustrates that AI deterrence would be successful 
since states’ leaders are usually driven by security-seeking interests. This also implies 
that the foreseen AI MAD structure would go in parallel with nuclear MAD, thereby a 
defensive doctrine would be adopted.  
 
To ensure a successful AI deterrence, states should use latent violence and credible 
threats to compel and deter adversaries from doing unwanted actions. As 
Ambassadors Erfan and Haggag argued, attribution and accountability are 
foundational in deterrence, (Erfan, Haggag, 2019). Like nuclear and cyber deterrence, 
AI deterrence per se could entail “deterrence by punishment” through the execution of 
an AI retaliatory attack, and “deterrence by denial” by the development of more AI 
capabilities. On contrary to other deterrence postures, the deterring state could invoke 
credible threats by “the threat of disruption to a state’s political, fiscal, power, 
weapon, financial, electoral systems,” (Haggag, 2019). As Ambassador Haggag 
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noted, AI can disrupt thing of value for punishment or it can deny the use of AI 
applications and other capabilities”, (Haggag, 2019). Based on that, nuclear weapons 
are not the sole agent of destruction, as Ambassador Haggag claimed, since the 
disruption of critical infrastructure could result in complete destruction. AI deterrence 
could also include the threat of mass manipulation or penetration, thereby paralyzing 
and neutralizing critical systems, especially the weapon systems.  Thus, AI deterrence 
could be a standalone policy. 
 
However, there are possible scenarios for using latent violence based the type of 
weapons and capabilities possessed besides to AI, as follows: (i) when two nuclear 
states possess AI capabilities, deterrence by punishment will be employed not only 
because of the possession of nuclear weapons, but also the parity in AI capabilities; 
(ii) when a nuclear state and a non-nuclear state possess AI capabilities, deterrence by 
preempt ion and denial will be effective; (iii)when two non-nuclear states possess AI 
and cyber capabilities, deterrence by preemption and denial will be used.  
 
Conclusion: 
Based on the foregoing, AI, as a weapon enabler, tightens the security dilemma 
between states in symmetric and asymmetric conflicts. After the in-depth 
investigation, deterrence could be effective and a MAD like structure is probable in 
the AI realm because of neutralization and mutual vulnerability. Notwithstanding, 
there is no a 100 percent guarantee that leaders won’t miscalculate situations amid the 
growing uncertainty and their great reliance on machines that can be manipulated or 
neutralized when AI and cyber defense systems are not shielded or amateur. So, 
human-machine teaming is essential for having a successful deterrence and 
minimizing errors as much as possible. As Dr/General Khalaf suggested that human 
intervention would be needed, should a technical error or an intentional error 
happened. In that regard, he referred to a well-known western saying “Don’t trust too 
much in technology.” He envisions that as long as AI applications are updated and are 
scrutinized by humans, on a regular basis, besides to military simulations, wrong war 
decisions and miscalculations won’t take place, (Khalaf, 2019).  
 
To conclude, the second scenario is the most possible scenario since deterrence 
requires the psychological factor along with rational thinking in war calculus which 
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entails military, political and economic aspects. To that end, states will never 
relinquish its monopoly over fire power to machines or AI applications.  
 
On the backdrop, the anticipated AI MAD, which could be coined as “Mutually 
Assured Manipulation”, could operate in parallel with nuclear MAD. Also, AI MAD 
could embolden nuclear MAD when humans are over-the-loop.  
  
Finally, further research should be made to tackle the implications of AI on the 
relations between state actors and non-state actors and such asymmetric struggles 
which cannot be mitigated amid crisis instability. It is also suggested to do further 
research on how the weaponization of outer space, coupled with the possession of AI 
capabilities, would threaten deterrence. By the same token, further research should be 
done to investigate how AI could shuffle the foundations of international peace and 
security, such as the concept of collective security.   
 
Policy Implications: 
 
AI vertical proliferation and hasty AI race instigate instability, thereby exacerbating 
the security dilemma and increasing military expenditure with the aim of catching up 
capabilities and ensuring arms race stability, (Altmann et al, 2017). AI race has been 
augmented for maintaining strategic stability and for preventing the adversary from 
being ahead. However, the proliferation of AI should be regulated for maintaining 
arms race stability which requires the planned deployments of arms in terms of scope 
and pace, (Altmann et al, 2017). Maintaining strategic stability rests on ensuring the 
planned development and proliferation of such novel asymmetric capabilities in age 
of information and economic warfare.  
 
Though AI exacerbates the security dilemma and accelerates proliferation, AI 
provides a potential for confidence-building through the formation of a regime for 
arms control and the promotion of disarmament, (Haggag, 2019). Such an anticipated 
regime could pave the way for regulating the unplanned deployment of such novel 
technologies and AI which in turn spark crisis instability and stimulate arms race, 
(Altmann et al, 2017).  
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Unsurprisingly, such a fierce commercial competition has been defused to the military 
sphere, rendering the development of AI applications that meet the requirements of 
the military uses (Altmann et al, 2017). Such a paradigm shift in the rapid 
proliferation of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) and AI applications, which do 
not require Herculean efforts or exotic materials as opposed to nuclear and 
conventional weapons, demonstrates the urgency of regulating the uses of AI and 
AWS in the context of the ongoing information warfare, and also indicates the 
necessity of controlling AI race in the context of the current economic warfare.  
 
Since Big Data and the Internet of Things have been weaponized, the suggested 
regime should put limitations on the weaponization of Big Data which threatens not 
only states, but also institutions and individuals, (Rashad, 2019). Also, the 3D printing 
or Addictive Manufacturing (AM) technology that allows second-, third-tier states 
and non-state actors to develop AI or AWS raises the alarm over the possible 
irrational use of AI by non-state actors or individuals.  This means that any AI arms 
control regime should take all necessary measures and steps to ensure the 
inaccessibility of both the 3D printing technology and AI applications to non-state 
actors.     
 
Since AI race has evolved in the context of economic rivalries and economic warfare 
before being diluted to the military sphere, state actors will no longer have a 
monopoly over the ongoing AI race given that the private sector has become a part of 
the game. This also means that establishing a regime for regulating the uses of AI and 
controlling its race requires the incorporation of multi-stakeholders, including the 
private companies which are implicitly competing with state actors and are thriving 
for promoting human security. This mirrors the clash between maintaining strategic 
stability and a state’s national security on one hand, and promoting human security 
and gaining profit on the other. Such ever-intensifying commercial competition 
illustrates the underlying dilemma between promoting free-market economy and 
maintaining strategic stability, implying the impossibility of regulating AI, (Khalaf, 
2019). Dr/General Khalaf was absolutely right when he articulated that regulating 
competition is impossible from an economic point of view, but that does not 
necessarily mean that regulating AI uses in the commercial, cyber and military 
spheres is improbable too, otherwise militaries will always be under the threat of 
being neutralized since private companies have the know-how of such applications 
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and are aware of their inherent vulnerabilities. The suggested regime could settle this 
by promoting the sense of ownership among stakeholders.   
 
Besides to the arms control point, the nexus between maintaining a meaningful human 
control and eclipsing humans control could trigger states to alter their military 
doctrines and policies. As per the Bob Work; the US deputy Secretary of Defense, the 
full delegation of authority to AI and algorithms is highly improbable except for the 
cyber realm, (Altmann et al, 2017). However, such an option could not be sustained, 
should an adversarial state signaled it willingness to delegate more authority to AI-
enabled machines, ((Altmann et al, 2017). Consequently, the AI race could be 
protracted to the extent of triggering collateral damage. Though, such a signaling to 
delegate military’s decision-making to fully autonomous applications deemed 
improbable, it is worrisome since AI and AWS cannot act in conformity with the 
principles and foundations of international law and the international legal norms, 
particularly the International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflicts, as 
well as they could increase the incidences of speedy and mechanized wars that cannot 
be fathomed or controlled. The mere thinking of a swarm combat triggers crisis 
instability since the assumption of high chances of war will takeover, (Altmann et al, 
2017). It further increases the likelihoods of escalation, as Paul Scharre implied, there 
is no a guarantee for winning a swarm war, unless well-programmed algorithms are 
developed and are used, otherwise the outcomes will be disastrous because of timely 
counterattacks, (Altmann et al, 2017). If machines have been delegated to make war 
decisions, there would have been no chances for practicing restraints or double-
checking, (Altmann et al, 2017).  The suggested regime, coupled with international 
legal instruments, could address this point by ushering for a meaningful human 
control.               
 
The intractability of such a kind of technology makes attribution difficult and 
problematic. The inherent difficulty of establishing attribution rests on the inability to 
know the attributor since the attributor could be a state, non-state actor or even a 
“third party who has interest in the outcomes of any potential crisis, confrontation 
with the use of a certain weapon system”. The only possible way for establishing 
attribution, apart from those suggestions focusing on the legal perspective, is human 
intelligence by which humans can collect data and process them according to the 
strategic climate, (Khalaf, 2019).  With the establishment of an arms control regime, 
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the issue of attribution could be resolved by the development of legally binding 
instruments, and the development of political, security and economic frameworks.     
 
Surely, AI arms control does not only pave the way for creating a regime that would 
maintain strategic stability within the AI sphere, but also preventing the fall of the AI 
technology in the wrong hands by laying out parameters for AI production and AI 
arms trade without hindering competition.     
 
 
 
Policy Recommendations: 
 
There is no doubt that the AI technology, similarly to nuclear capabilities, has been 
weaponized.  Therefore, the stealthy potentials of AI could pose high security 
concerns that might reshuffle the world order and might make the parameters of 
international peace and security at a shaky ground. In the era of globalization, the 
weaponization of AI, without being regulated, would definitely add further hurdles to 
strategic stability.   
 
Much as, there is no empirical evidences of destruction triggered by the use of AI in 
the military domain, the international community should not wait till an AI Pearl 
Harbor, AI Hiroshima and Nagasaki or such-like incidents take place. Is the history 
repeating itself? There is no a unified stance on how to manage and regulate the uses 
of AI for civilian and particularly military purposes amid the new Cold War.   
 
There are two possible scenarios for regulating AI. Each of those scenarios has its 
own parameters and regulatory agenda:  
(I) AI is not a weapon, but a technology that can alter a weapon’s technology, 
(Erfan, 2019) and can be integrated into numerous military systems, 
(Concluding Report, 2018). Thus, the supposition of drafting additional 
protocol to the Convention on Conventional Weapons for banning AI 
seems irrelevant. In such a scenario, it is worthy of consideration to see 
how the foreseen AI arms control regime would shape the nuclear and 
cyber arms control regimes. More important, the issue of accountability 
and state responsibility should be considered in that regard;  
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(II) AI and such kinds of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), such 
as submarines drones, are coined as weapons. In that regard, they should 
be prohibited, (Geist, 2016). In that case, an additional protocol to the 
Conventional on Conventional Weapons should be drafted for banning AI 
and LAWS.      
 
The first policy option is the doable one. Therefore, the international community 
should take the following measures to incrementally formulate a multilateral regime 
for regulating AI, as it was the case with nuclear weapons:  
  
1) National AI and Cyber Policies: According to the “routine activity” theory 
which articulates that individuals, institutions and states unilaterally deter 
themselves/itself when the threats associated with technological advancement 
are growing, (Rashad, 2019), states should draft national laws for regulating 
the AI and cyber activities based on the degree of advancement and the degree 
of dependence on technology, (Rashad, 2019).   
2) Drafting Bilateral Agreements: Resembling to nuclear weapons, states are 
recommended to sign such-like START agreements for managing the uses of 
AI applications; defining a threshold for cyber and AI attacks, and information 
and technology sharing, as well as strengthening cyber and AI defensive 
measures at the bilateral level.  
Such bilateral agreements could open the room for the evolvement of a legal 
norm.    
3) Super-soft Law for AI: Similar to nuclear restraint, AI restraint could pave 
the way for managing, regulating or containing the development of AI for 
military uses, (Maas, 2019). Such a bottom-up law-making approach, which 
necessitates the incorporation all actors and stakeholders (INGOs, scientists, 
academia, security experts, developers and individuals), could come out with 
non-binding speculative rules and regulations, (Burri, 2017). However, such 
non-binding speculative rules and regulations could be the stepping stone for 
legally binding rules. They could also set redlines for AI-enabled attacks, such 
as AI-enabled nuclear strikes, thus establishing an AI taboo.  
4) Promoting AI Arms Control Rather Than Non-Proliferating It: We 
cannot reverse or ban the AI technology and lethal autonomous weapons 
systems, (LAWS) as Schultz articulated “Proliferation begets proliferation”, 
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(Maas, 2019). Since the AI technology is not unlawful but its malicious uses, 
(Cavelty, et al, 2017) all we can do is regulating its uses and circumscribing its 
lethality through the drafting of a multilateral agreement. Reaching an 
agreement regulating the uses of AI, more or less, illustrates states’ acceptance 
to regulate AI and its uses inasmuch as they will hold a monopoly over the use 
of AI for military purposes, (Erfan, 2019).  
Mindful that, vague legal terms, such as the term “control” could be 
interpreted differently and loosely by states based on their preferences, (Burri, 
2017). This illustrates that tight and precise legal terms should be used.   
Further, preventive prohibition seems convincible since it would neither 
prohibit the technology itself nor add restrictions on quantitative proliferation 
of AI applications, but the prohibition of certain military practices, (Altmann 
et al, 2017). Thus, a legally-binding multilateral agreement, comprehensively 
outlawing certain uses of AI, is highly recommended in that regard.  
 
5)  Drafting a Multilateral Agreement for Regulating AI: Such an agreement 
shall be drafted based on the foreseeable AI norms and in conformity with 
international legal instruments. In addition, it shall include clause(s) on:  
a) Meaningful Degree of Humans’ Control and Keeping Humans 
Over-the-loop: Based on the foregoing analysis, a degree of a human 
control over a machine is essential for commanding and controlling 
the course of war, otherwise the outcomes will be disastrous. Humans 
can act as operators, (Autonomous Weapons & Human Control, 2016) 
under the context of human-machine teaming, so as to manage the 
course of war at the operational, tactical and strategic levels. They can 
also be moral agents by weighting the degree of collateral damage that 
might be trigged by the excessive or inadequate use of force, 
(Autonomous Weapons & Human Control, 2016). The whole issue is 
not only about maintaining a meaningful degree of human control, but 
also making human control on par with and in conformity with the 
principles of military necessity, proportionality, distinction, etc, and 
addressing the issues of controllability, moral responsibility and 
accountability, (Horowitz et al, 2015). To ensure a meaningful human 
control, it essential to meet three core requirements: (i) making 
informed decisions about the usage of weapons, (ii) having sufficient 
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information and maintaining a situational awareness of the course of 
war, so as to ensure the legality of actions, and (iii) training humans 
on how to control and use weapons effectively after being tested, 
(Horowitz et al, 2015).  Adding to this, conducting regular updates of 
AI applications, (Rashad, Khalaf, 2019) is a pre-requisite for 
maintaining a meaningful degree of human control. The suggested 
clause(s) should also stipulate for defining “a meaningful control” as: 
“control by design” by which the operator has the ability to monitor 
information about the context and system, and “control in use” 
through which the operator monitors the operational environment and 
the system to ensure compliance with IHL, (Concluding Report, 
2018).   
b) The Uses of AI: Resembling to nuclear weapons, we cannot stop or 
reverse the development of AI. Then, AI should be regulated and 
humans should be hold accountable in the AI domain, (Erfan, 2019). 
By regulating AI, it means the regulation of its uses and regulating the 
conducts of states, individuals, companies and the international 
community in the AI sphere, (Erfan, 2019). Lucas argued that the use 
of LAWS in uninhabited areas and against unmanned targets makes it 
lawful, (Cavelty, 2017). Needless to say, AI regulations should entail 
the prohibition of certain applications and the permitting of others, 
(Erfan, 2019). Further, AI regulations should outline what humans can 
do and what they cannot do in the AI domain.  
Since states, according to Article 36 of the Additional Protocol of the 
1977 Geneva Convention, are obliged to determine whether a certain 
use of a weapon be seen as a violation by international law or not, 
(Cavelty, 2017), it is highly suggested to add a clause stressing on that 
obligation. To this end, the suggested clause should require every state 
to take the following into consideration: (i) the characteristics of a 
weapon and its technology, (ii) the context in which LAWS are used 
i.e: remote or populated areas, (Lewis, 2013), (iii) the military targets, 
(iv) the level and degree of residual human control over the LAWS, 
(Cavelty, et al, 2017).   
c) Accountability and Moral Responsibility: In the event of 
malfunction, hacking, miscalculations or inadequate use of force in 
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violation of IHL and the Law of Armed Conflicts, the issues of 
accountability and liability loom over given that it is hard to hold 
machines liable and it will be unfair to inflict liability upon 
commanders or programmers in that case, (Fournier, 2018). It will 
also be impossible to hold a manufacturer accountable given he/she is 
not a subject of the International Criminal Law which only prosecutes 
individuals, particularly states’ leaders. Adding to the further muddied 
situation, states cannot be prosecuted according to the “doctrine of 
sovereign immunity” even it has been proved that states were 
responsible for using autonomous weapon systems, (Fournier, 2018). 
Because of sovereign immunity, certain states have extended 
sovereignty to manufacturer, (Fournier, 2018), thereby prosecuting 
manufacturers will be almost impossible. Thus, the international 
community should not afford machines to make war decisions without 
holding someone accountable, (Erfan, Haggag, Rashad, 2019).  This 
illustrates that when humans are over-the-loop, perpetrators and 
programmers should be held accountable according to international 
law and a state responsibility shall be claimed.  
d) AI/Cyber Red Lines: All stakeholders should develop a threshold, 
outlining and defining what constitutes an offensive/defensive AI-
enabled attack in the cyber plane, (Rashad, 2019). For instance, AI 
attacks conducted by fully-autonomous applications should be 
regarded as offensive.  
e) AI as a Technology of Mass Destruction: It is intriguing to classify 
the malicious AI technology as a Technology of Mass Destruction.  
f) The Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Non-Combatants: 
Amid the intense inclination to weaponize AI, coupled with the 
absence of internet governance, a clause for protecting noncombatants 
in cyberspace should be taken as a priority over other issues, (Guay et 
al, 2017).  
 
6) Establishing an IAEA-like Agency for AI Arms Control: “It is possible to 
create an arms control regime by the establishment of an international 
authority for regulating the usage of AI in the military realm”, (Al-Sayed, 
2019). It is highly suggested to establish a supranational agency, referred to as 
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the “International Agency for Regulating AI and Newly Emerging 
Technologies”. The objectives of this Agency are: regulating the uses of AI 
and curbing its malicious uses; ensuring a state’s compliance with AI peaceful 
safeguards; slowing down AI proliferation. The competences of the Agency 
include: overseeing the development of AI applications for military purposes 
through the deployment of inspection missions, on a regular basis; ensuring a 
state’s compliance with international AI safeguards and verification methods, 
as well as encouraging and overseeing AI research and development in 
member states. Further, the Agency, with the help of its technical staff, is 
responsible for providing technical assistance and submitting technical 
recommendations/reports to the UNSC, UNGA and the UN Office of 
Disarmament Affairs. Furthermore, the Agency should cooperate with any OIs 
to be created in the future or other like-minded IOs, which are responsible 
ensuring nuclear safeguards and verifications, and promoting cyber safety and 
security.    
 
More important, it shall refer/file a case, when the pace of AI 
development/race endangers international peace and security, to the UN 
General Assembly or the UN Security Council.   
 
The organizational structure of the anticipated Agency shall be composed of: 
a. The General Forum; an international forum for discussing technicalities 
and security implications of AI and emerging technologies. Each member 
either a state, IO, INGO, academia, developer, technician or private 
company has one vote. This Forum shall submit its recommendations and 
suggestions, including multilateral agreements, to the Supreme Council; 
b. The Supreme Council which shall be composed of 20 member-states and 
5 miscellaneous members representing the academia, private sector and 
competent IOs/INGOs, with equitable representation. Its resolutions are 
binding. Those 20 members shall be elected every two years.  
The competences of the Council shall include, inter alia,  
I. Discussing substantial matters; 
II. Determining if a certain act or step threatens international peace 
and security. Should an action be proven to be a severe violation 
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of international legal instruments, the Council shall refer the 
issue/case to the UN Security Council or competent IOs;  
III. Taking all measures, including, but not limited to, punitive 
measures, should a member state violated the Charter, 
international legal instruments regulating AI and other emerging 
technologies, or have shown non-compliance with the Agency 
Safeguards;  
IV. Cooperating with other IOs and INGOs, to mention but few, the 
International Atomic energy Agency and the International 
Telecommunication Union, for discussing and coming out with 
solutions for any issue that threatens international peace and 
security; 
V. Sponsoring bilateral agreements for AI software control. 
c. The Research and Development (R&D) Department: This Department 
shall be a global hub for R&D in AI and other emerging technologies. It 
shall coordinate and compile all research and endeavors; call for further 
research; submit reports/compiled recommendations to the General 
Forum;   
d. Technical Assistance Task Force and Inspection Missions: This body 
shall provide technical assistance, if deems necessary or upon a state’s 
request, to ensure a state’s compliance with the Agency Safeguards. The 
Task Force shall be primarily composed of inspectors from the Agency. 
Also, inspectors from like-minded IOs or Agencies, namely the IAEA, 
can participate in the inspection missions, on a voluntarily basis; 
e. M&E mechanisms, AI safeguards and Verifications: It shall ensure 
members’ full compliance with the Agency Safeguards and Verification 
Measures. It shall also develop new safeguards and verifications, when it 
is deemed necessary.  
Corresponding to nuclear safeguards, of which nuclear material and 
facilities cannot be upgraded to a weapon-grade and are not used for 
military purposes, (Safeguards Agreements), AI safeguards are 
recommended for verifying the peaceful applications of AI and ensuring 
a state’s compliance with the foresseable internationally-recognized AI 
threshold. The AI Safeguards could include regular weapons and data 
reviews; regular updates for AI applications; AI applications are not 
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upgraded to a weapon-grade; a meaningful human control in the military 
sphere; the disaggregation of civilian and military AI applications;  
f. Department for Promoting the Rational Use of Weapons: This 
Department shall be composed of sub-departments: nuclear, cyber and 
conventional. It shall, in conjunction with the IAEA, ITU or state parties 
to the United Nations Convention on Conventional Weapons, ensure the 
proper usage of AI and other emerging technologies when they are bolted 
into other weapons.  It shall also curb or mitigate the misuse of AI and 
other emerging technologies in the military realm.  
g. The Dispute Settlement Mechanism: The Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
shall settle any dispute that may arise between member states or a 
member-state and a non-member state.   
h. The Attributive Mechanism: The Mechanism shall provide advisory 
opinions on attributive measures and shall develop a framework for 
attribution and accountability by developing AI-enabled thresholds based 
on the type of weapons used or the degree of destruction.  
i. The Mitigation Mechanism: The Mechanism shall assist states in 
remediating the unwanted impacts of wrongful use of AI application or 
unintentional error.  
 
7) Revising the Nuclear Arms Control Regime: With the growing challenges 
of emerging technologies and AI, there is a need to revise the nuclear arms 
control regime and add clause(s) regulating the uses of AI in the nuclear 
domain.   
 
A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step, internet governance is seen 
as the stepping stone for AI regulations. Thereupon, a revolutionary paradigm-shift, 
incorporating technical, ethical, moral and political dimensions in the standardization 
process, (Burri, 2017) is a requisite for internet governance. Microsoft manager’s 
suggestion of the formation of a neutral digital Switzerland is welcome since it will 
harness the private companies to be detached from developing offensive 
tech/applications; to combat state-sponsored cyberattacks, as well as establishing 
attribution for state-sponsored cyberattacks and taking necessary measures to 
remediate the repercussions of such large-scale attacks, (Smith, 2017).  
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Appendix: 
 
Annex (1): 
 
The elements of MAD include: 
 
1. Scale of Destruction: It basically focuses on the idea of “sparing” rather than 
damage limitation, (Fairbanks, 2004). It considers number of causalities and 
degrees of collateral damage and bloodshed. With the increase of inaccuracy 
in weapon-targeting, the possibility of collateral damage increases, (Fairbanks, 
2004). More importantly is the pace of devastation and its extremity, (Jervis, 
2009), as well as the speed that causes devastation and damages to occur, 
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(Schelling, 2008).  
2. Proportionality of Punishment: As Thomas Schelling and Bernard Brodie 
pointed out, it is all about reciprocal killing or “mutual kill”, (Jervis, 2009). 
The US Department of Defense coined this phenomenon the “return evil for 
evil”, (Schelling, 2008, p.7). It is also known as deterrence by punishment 
which measures the extent of punishment and how it will inflict pain upon the 
attacker.  
3. The Demonstrative Aspect: It is the “power to hurt”, a sort of coercive 
diplomacy by which the defender uses credible threats of inflicting damage 
and ultimatums, with the aim of influencing the offender’s motives., 
(Schelling, 2008). It is a way of dissuading the offender from carrying out an 
attack.  
4. Motives and Interests: The heart of MAD is the psychological factor that 
contributes to its success. It is the case where leaders are overwhelmed by 
mutual fear of errors, intentions and conflict of interests, (Jervis, 2009).  
5. Pace of Advancement in Military/Nonmilitary Technology: Modern 
technologies favor defense due to their great lethality and mobility, as opposed 
to infantry technologies and cavalry warfare which favored offense over 
defense, given that the current technologies are not neutralized by the 
innovation of novel and more advanced technologies (Van Evera, 2013).   
6. Parity/disparity: It investigates how the level of parity/disparity in 
technological advancement and weapon procurement could influence a state’s 
decision and prove the existence of a security dilemma since such an 
advancement emboldens the strength of a state vis-à-vis its rival, (Jervis, 
2009).    
7. Uncertainty: Uncertainty could arise over rivals’ intentions on whether they 
are malicious or security-seeking, (Tang, 2009) since some weapons are 
defensive in nature but can be offensively used, (Jervis, 2009).  
8. Lack of Communication: Uncertainty over intentions reflects the lack of 
communication between rivals since deterrence requires transparency, as 
opposed to offense which requires secrecy over power, force, etc., (Van Evera, 
2013).    
9. Possible Implications in case of Intentional/Unintentional Error: The margin 
of intentional versus unintentional error can be reflected in the case of the 
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Cuban Missile Crisis. Therefore, it is urgent to raise the question about the 
effects of error on the expected utility of AI.  
10. Indivisibility of Control: The core of this idea is the unity of command and 
control over weapons to make any MAD-like scheme effective, (Fairbanks, 
2004).  
11. Wartime Operation: A group of theorists argued that intensity of war is based 
on (1) interests at stakes; the more interests at issue, the higher intensity of war 
and (2) the ability to punish in return for escalatory acts, (Van Evera, 2013).  
12. Second-strike Capability Vs. First-strike Capability: It is the rational calculus 
of a first-strike based on the opponent’s ability to carry out a second-strike. It 
nullifies the advantage of a first-strike since there is reciprocal fear of spiral 
attacks and the first-mover advantage seems dangerous given that it can spur a 
vicious circle of attack, (Van Evera, 2013). Thomas Schelling, however, 
argued that the first-strike capability assesses benefits associated with using 
weapons through preemptive strikes, (Van Evera, 2013). Its advantages 
include: the feasibility of gaining surprise without detection, the shift in the 
balance of power, and the dominance of offense when the attacker can defend 
itself and conquer its rivals and, finally, the extent of political punishment, 
(Van Evera, 2013).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex (2):  
Detailed Description of Variables:  
Independent Variables:  
a. Human-over-the-loop: Human supervises the loop, though delegating tasks 
to machines as it is the case in Air Drones. 
1
 
                                                 
1
 De Spiegeleire, S., Maas, M., & Swejis, T. (n.d.). ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
AND THE FUTURE OF DEFENSE. Retrieved from 
https://www.hcss.nl/sites/default/files/files/reports/Artificial Intelligence and the 
Future of Defense.pdf 
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b. Human-out-of-the-loop: Human has no control over machines since 
machines have the power to decide and act. 
2
 
 
Dependent Variables:  
1) In the era of digital warfare, the degree of military digitalization varies from 
one state to the other, thus, the degree of vulnerability varies as well. There are 
three degrees of dependence on technology:  
I. Digitally-Independent States: A military does not have large networks 
for command and control and its conventional weapons do not require 
digital technology. Thus, a state is not vulnerable to cyberattacks, 
(Schneider, 2016). 
3
  
II. Digitally-Enabled States: A state uses technology for the sake of 
enhancing its network-centered military operations. Such a state 
utilizes datalinks to convey off/circumvent targeting information. It 
relies on digitally-enabled applications for cyber intelligence, so as to 
raise situational awareness. The state’s military prefers analogue or 
hard copy processes. Iran is a perfect example of such a state, 
(Schneider, 2016).  
III. Digitally-Dependent States: A state that is highly dependent on 
technology and its command and control systems are limitless over the 
horizons and its military has data fusion centers. It implements 
network-centered operations with the use of datalinks and virtual 
computing.  Virtual computing is highly effective for off-boarding 
intelligence and for ensuring the optimization of decision-making. 
More importantly, the state’s conventional operations heavily rely on 
technology, (Schneider, 2016).  
2) Sparing: The term “Sparing” is usually associated with MAD. The term 
“sparing” implies that mutual vulnerability does exist. City-sparing and cyber-
sparing were coined by theorists and experts when both nuclear and cyber 
                                                 
2
 Russell, S. J., & Norvig, P. (2010). Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach. 
Retrieved from https://www.cin.ufpe.br/~tfl2/artificial-intelligence-modern-
approach.9780131038059.25368.pdf 
 
 
3
 Schneider, J. (2016). Digitally-Enabled Warfare. Retrieved from 
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/digitally-enabled-warfare-the-capability-
vulnerability-paradox 
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MAD loomed over in the IR literature. Now, with the current inclination to 
develop AI applications for military purposes, the phenomenon could be 
referred to as “machine-sparing”. The term “machine-sparing” portrays how 
countries, cities, individuals, cyberspace, and machines are equally subjected 
to mutual threats or attacks. The scale of destruction exceeds human control if 
machines have been mandated to act.  “Machine-sparing” indicates that 
militarized AI applications (used without any control or regulation) could 
destroy the land and thereon.      
3) Latent Violence: MAD becomes successful when latent violence is used by 
the defender. The core of nuclear latent deterrence is the deterrence by 
punishment, (Fuhrmann, 2018)
4
 whereas deterrence by denial is the principal 
element of cyber MAD.  But for AI MAD, it is still unclear whether 
deterrence by punishment, denial or entanglement would be a workable 
strategy.   
4) Expected Utility, (Slayton, 2017) and Cost-benefit Analysis: States, as per 
IR theorists, act rationally and state leaders do not rush to war unless the 
consequences are cost effective and the interests are vital for state survival. AI 
applications usually have implications on the governmental decision-making 
process, this is reflected in; policies, objectives, interests, values and 
calculations with the increasing tendency to use them across sectors. 
Furthermore, AI applications shape a state’s geographical position, political 
values and foreign policy. AI applications also promote a state’s economic 
progress, thereby affecting the calculus of war. Thus, the nature of the 
utilization of nonmilitary capabilities will likely change due to AI 
applications. The cost-benefit analysis may include: 
I. Costs of Offense/Defense, (Slayton, 2017)5:  
The cost of military innovation in today’s world is crucial for making 
accurate calculations and developing well-defined strategies and plans. 
Military technology, like other types of technology and business 
                                                 
4
 Fuhrmann, M. (2018). The Logic of Latent Nuclear Deterrence. Retrieved from 
http://www.iserp.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/Deterrence without Bombs 2018-0129.pdf 
 
5
 Slayton, R. (2017, February 18). What Is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance?: 
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organizations, have both direct and indirect costs, thereby shaping the 
military strategy.   
a) Direct Cost: Direct costs usually include the costs of software 
development and regular updates of software; hardware 
production; designing effective security systems in both virtual and 
real realms; weapon production; coding; algorithms and swarms.   
b) Indirect Cost: Indirect costs are comprised of the allocation of 
spaces and laboratories; research and development (R&D); the 
provision of infrastructure; the wages and salaries of software, 
coding and algorithm developers, as well as the costs of training on 
coding and algorithms for military staff and personnel. 
II. Comparison, (Handel, 1991)6: Every state investigates the degree of 
advancement in its military equipment such as its defense system and 
software (which is not enabled by AI). It compares the size of its 
military forces and arsenals. It also determines the amount of data 
possessed and retrieved through surveillance operations. In today’s 
warfare and the information age, each state evaluates its capacities in 
terms of intelligence operations and espionage. Such evaluation and 
assessment definitely helps every state to recognize its comparative 
advantage/strengths and its weaknesses, as opposed to other 
states/adversaries.    
III. Calculus of War, (Handel, 1991): Every state should be compelled to 
cross-examine: 
(i) the chances of victory, and how AI applications increase or 
reduce the chances of victory in the case of considering an 
offensive AI strike;  
(ii) the risks of disrupting AI applications and other similar 
cyber capabilities in the case of considering a defensive AI 
counterstrike and in the case of having an amateur security 
system. 
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More importantly, similar to nuclear weapons, the scale of 
destruction and the number of causalities should be estimated since 
offensive AI applications could make war much more destructive.     
a. Duration and Scale of Operations: The duration of war is 
usually considered by policy-makers since duration defines 
the scale of operation, (Handel, 1991). This has 
dramatically changed with the emergence of AI, given that 
it is faster than the human pace. 
b. Perception of Threats, (Handel, 1991): The security 
dilemma is typically exacerbated when a state assumes its 
interest(s) is/are at stake. The weaponization of AI will 
redefine threats at all levels; policy-makers and security 
experts will perceive threats differently since the war battle 
has been transferred to cyberspace and has shifted from 
being a war between military personnel to a war between 
machines and AI-enabled systems. The perception of 
threats will be based on the degree of dependence 
on/independence from technology. Yet, the degree of 
dependence on technology and cyber capabilities is critical 
in perceiving threats; the implications of using conventional 
capabilities, either disjointedly or alongside AI capabilities, 
should be considered. Policy-makers will define threats 
triggered by the development of AI capabilities as either 
positive or negative.           
c. Balance of Power: The inconvenience from the shift in the 
balance of power comes first, since any shift in the balance 
of power basically means putting a state’s interests at risk 
and having a influence on a state’s decisions and abilities, 
(Horowitz, 2018)
7
. AI, similar to other capabilities, will 
alter the balance of power in favor of the superior, as 
President Putin implied, the top AI application developer 
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will ultimately hold the most power. Nevertheless, AI 
should be measured as a variable of power vis-à-vis other 
sorts of power (i.e. economic, political or geopolitical, etc.). 
5) Estimation of Military and Nonmilitary Capabilities (Highly 
Advanced/Amateur): The estimation of non-AI military capabilities in terms 
of quantity and degree of advancement, should be taken into consideration in 
order to measure the effect of either highly advanced or amateur AI 
capabilities on other them. The rationale behind this is to question the 
significance of other capabilities with the possession of advanced AI.  
6) Means and Levels of Communication 
(Weak/Strong/Absent/Interconnected Networks): Since the security 
dilemma is often tightened as a result of the lack of communication and 
uncertainty over intentions, levels of communication should be hypothesized 
as follows: 
(i) weak or strong, if humans have a role, 
(ii) absent or interconnected networks, if humans are absent and 
out-of-the-loop. 
The purpose is comparing levels of communication between states with the 
presence or the absence of the human aspect.     
7) Estimation of Quantities and Level of Advancement (Equal/Unequal) in 
AI Applications: Disparity in nuclear capabilities increased the security 
dilemma between the two superpowers during the Cold War era. As is the case 
with nuclear weapons, the disparity in the number of possessed AI 
applications and the level of advancement in AI software will exacerbate the 
security dilemma. It is suggested to measure the parity/disparity in AI 
capabilities as either equal or unequal, so as to help states in their calculations.    
8) Intentions (Malicious/Security-seeking): Intentions are the cornerstone of 
MAD and the security dilemma as they create uncertainty. Intentions could 
either be malicious or security-seeking when the ruling elite has a say in the 
military decision-making process.   
9) Calculations (Right/Mistaken):  Unlike intentions, machines or software 
cannot be judged on their intentions but they can be judged on the correctness 
of their calculation. 
10) Scope of Human Participation in the Decision-making Process 
(Limited/Unlimited): Delegating the military’s decision-making process to 
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machines (i.e. giving the machines absolute authority) is still highly unlikely, 
though the declining role of human beings in military decision-making is 
worthy of consideration with the emergence of AI.  
11) Degree of Control Over Machines (Absent/Active): AI will not only 
undermine role of humans in the decision-making process, but will also make 
their role almost absent during the course of war. Thus, the degree of human 
control over machines and software must be measured as either absent or 
active.    
12)  Margin of Error (Human Vs. Machine): Both human and machine errors 
are highly possible and highly destructive. Error should be measured as either 
more common when the human is out of the loop/over the loop.   
13) Command and Control (Reliable/Unreliable), (Slayton, 2017)8: With the 
development of AI applications for military purposes, the absolute authority, 
which was once only given to the military’s command and control system, has 
become sharable and divisible with software and machinery.  With the 
adoption of AI, the command and control system is unreliable, given that AI-
enabled machines, which could be mandated to make decisions, could be 
disrupted. Therefore, AI command and control could either be reliable or 
unreliable based on the degree of human control.      
14) Attribution and Accountability: Comparable to cyber capabilities, 
attribution and legitimacy are problematic not only because the difficulty of 
identifying and proving the identity of the attacker but also the impossibility 
of rebuking and penalizing a machine. It is also difficult to define 
accountability of machines in absolute terms, according to international 
lawyers, who are alarmed by the lack of efficacy and applicability of the Law 
of Armed Conflicts in the AI realm. It is suggested to use the cyber attribution 
indicators which include: technical, political and clandestine indicators, 
(Somara, 2019)
9
. The technical indicators recess IP addresses and makes log 
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file analysis, through text-strings, timestamps, C2 infrastructure, malware 
samples and credentials, (Davis et al, 2017)
10
 whereas the political indicators 
assess the diplomatic knowledge about political motivation and political 
operatives. Concerning the clandestine indicators or “All-Source Intelligence”, 
they examine classified data obtained by signals-intelligence, human 
intelligence and open-source intelligence, (Davis et al, 2017) coupled with 
political insights, (Somara, 2019)
11
. Signals-intelligence (SIGNT) is produced 
by collecting data from information technology systems, while Human 
intelligence (HUMINT) is produced by obtaining data from humans, (Davis et 
al, 2017). For all-source intelligence (OSINT) is produced by using open 
sources such as the internet to collect and process information, (Davis et al, 
2017).   
15) Counterattacks/Counterforce, (Lieber et al, 2017) (Probable/Improbable): 
There is an endless debate over the rationale of launching a preemptive or a 
preventive strike amid a high probability of a retaliatory strike. As it was the 
case with the nuclear weapons, AI could make a second-strike/counterattack 
probable whether humans are over or out-of-the-loop.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex (3): 
Brief History of AI:  
The small Dartmouth Project, which took place in 1956, marked the birth of Artificial 
Intelligence, (De Spiegeleire et al, 2017).  Since then, AI, as a field of study, had 
evolved across six main phases. The first phase or the “First AI Spring” (1956-1975), 
marked the development of neural networks in its primitive forms, is considered as 
                                                                                                                                           
 
10
 Davis, J. et al. (2017, June 02). Could Stateless Attribution Promote International 
Cyber Accountability? Retrieved from 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2081.html 
 
11 Ibid 
 78 
the early golden age of AI since AI researchers succeeded in developing tools and 
prototypes systems capable of performing a limited range of tasks, such as algebra 
and games, as if they are carried out by humans, (De Spiegeleire et al, 2017). At the 
peak of the Cold War whereby the grandiose bulk of funds had been allocated to the 
military sphere, the AI research had slipped into its first winter (1974-1980) and 
speedy progress had been decelerated. In fact, the Cold War was not the sole reason 
that contributed to the slippery of AI into its first winter but also the discovery of 
ample possibilities for developing and underpinning AI algorithms in a manner that 
could deal with real-world problems, thereby sparking disagreements among AI 
researchers, (De Spiegeleire et al, 2017). In 1980s, AI research had witnessed its 
second spring with the advent of expert systems which were actually a group of rule-
based programs with limited tasks ranged from answering questions or solving 
problems, and with massive funds provided by governments for promoting AI 
research and the establishment of numerous AI companies, (De Spiegeleire et al, 
2017).  In spite of noticeable sales which reached up to 2 billion by 1988, many AI 
companies collapsed and AI research had entered its age of darkness for many reasons 
which included: (i) the development of desktop PCs by Apple and IBM and (ii) the 
limited utility of expert systems, (De Spiegeleire et al, 2017). Meanwhile, AI 
programs which were of military significance such as the autonomous battle tank 
program raised considerable funding, (De Spiegeleire et al, 2017). In an effort to 
reinvigorate AI research, AI researchers had disregarded their long-term goal of 
developing human-level AI applications and directed their focus to fragmented 
subfields by developing applications that solve specific problems, (De Spiegeleire et 
al, 2017). Due to the increasing utility of AI in logistics, satellite monitoring, 
spacecraft, traffic management, medical diagnostics and the military, funding had 
soared up in the mid-2000s, (De Spiegeleire et al, 2017). Tremendous financial 
contributions from Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Baidu, IBM and Microsoft have 
furthered AI research since these corporates use AI for developing business models 
and profit maximization, (De Spiegeleire et al, 2017). In response, AI has reached a 
tipping point with the proven predictive accuracy of algorithms, the increasing 
computing power, the Internet of Things and Big Data and cloud infrastructures, (De 
Spiegeleire et al, 2017). 
 
Annex (3):  
The Elements of the Proposed AI MAD Structure:  
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Mutually Assured Manipulation (MAM) 
 
1. Scale of Destruction: The scale of destruction could exceed the destructive 
potentials of nukes and conventional capabilities since they could be 
manipulated or disrupted.  
2. Proportionality: Proportionality could entail proportionality of manipulation, 
so as to increase uncertainty.  Manipulation could be the umbrella of other 
sources of deterrence.  
3. The Demonstrative Aspect (Latent Violence): States could employ deterrence 
by punishment, denial, disruption or manipulation.  
4. The Psychological Factor (Motives and Interests): Threat of manipulation and 
the fear of uncertainty would definitely dissuade states from launching a first-
strike.  
5. Pace of Advancement in Military/Nonmilitary Technology: The ever-
increasing uncertainty over the adversary’s AI capabilities coupled with the 
high potential of neutralizing a state’s defense and C2 systems makes 
deterrence operative.  
6. Parity/disparity: Disparity in AI could be reflected in the degree of 
advancement in AI military applications, while the number of applications 
would not be of great concern.  
7. Intentional/Unintentional Error: Errors either triggered by machines or 
humans could occur because of data manipulation and miscalculations.  
8. Second-strike Capability: Massive retaliatory attacks are highly probable in AI 
deterrence.  
 
 
 
 
